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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is both a qualitative and quantitative study, investigating the sustainability of 
Credit Management Services Limited (CMS) within the broader contex t of the Zambian 
micro finance industry. Micro finance is regarded as one of the tools for poverty reduction. 
As such, making microfinance available to many poor people is the purpose of 
microJinance. Over the years it has become clear that microfinance institutions have to 
operate efficiently and be self-sustai nable in order to continue assisting the poor. 
However. in spite of the support and encouragement given for sustainability, evidence 
shows that there are few sustainable microfinanee institutions in the world. The various 
factors impacting upon sustainability therefore, need to be examined and means of 
enhancing sustainabi Ii ty mapped out. 
The study brought to the fo re the main viewpoints regarding sustainability and how they 
have been inl1uenced by experiences of MFls around the world . The framework for 
discussion and analysis of operational sustainability, financ ial sustainability and 
operational e ffi ciency is also set out. The study discusses the Zambian microfinance 
industry and shows how and why the industry has emerged and grown in the past decade. 
Some constraints are identified that need to be dealt w ith in order to enhance 
sustainability of the industry. The study of CMS reveals that the institution is not yet 
fi nancially sustainable, but that its effi ciency levels are stead ily increasing as it has put in 
place mechanisms to recover costs, charge economic rates of interest and increase and 
maintain its client outreach. Indicators are that it is moving in the right direction with its 
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cost recovery. increasing client outreach and utilization of loans for on-lending as 
opposed to subsidies. This study therefore draws on the general experiences of the Credit 
management Services in order to draw lessons for the Zambian industry. The study will 
argue the case that though sustainability is difiicult to achieve, there arc positive 
indicators in the Zambian industry that thi s is poss ible and that CMS could be considered 
as an example. T his claim is verified against the experi ence on the gro und of Credit 
Management Services. 
The study concludes that building a sustainable microfinance industry anywhere is not 
the easiest task. Sustainabi li ty is possible but requires a lot of investment in capacity 
bui lding and del iberate steps for cost effi ciency, appropriate pricing poli cies and an 
increased client outreach . T he Zambian situation characterised by even a younger 
industry. will require not only a concerted effort in capacity building, but much more, the 
need to counter constra ints in the external environment of Mrls. Recommendations lo 
stake holders inc lude the need to utili se cheaper local human resources and invest in 
strengthening local institutions owned by local communities, to enhance the sustainability 
or micro finance initiatives. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This research report comprises a case study on the sustainability of a Zambian 
microfinance institution, Credit Management Services limited (CMS). The study sets out 
to analyse the sustainability of CMS in the broader context of the microfinance i11dustry 
in Zambia and draws conclusions and recommendations for stakeholders. This 
introductory chapter of the thesis presents the overview, the rationale of the study and 
states the research problem. The aims and objectives of the study, and structure of the 
thesis are also discussed. 
1.0 Overview 
The task of bui lding sustainable microfinance institutions1 (MFls) is an enormous one, 
because there are large numbers of poor entrepreneurs resulting in a high demand for 
financial services. Sustainability, in the context of microfinance institutions is widely 
accepted to be synonymous with financial viability and is regarded as necessary for an 
institution to increase its outreach to the poor. Ledgerwood ( 1999) points out that there 
are about 500 million economically active poor people in the world operating micro 
enterprises and small businesses, but most of them do not have access to adequate 
1 The tenn microfinance institution normally refers to non-Governmental Organ isations (NGOs) and/or 
private institutions providing financial services to poor entrepreneurs or low-income households. 
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financial services. In fact it is estimated that Microfinance2 only serves 16 million out of 
the total number of 500 million (CGAP FocusNote No. 20, May 200 1). In view of the 
fact that credit provision has an important role to play in poverty reduction, the need to 
develop and sustain the MF!s cannot be over emphasised. As a result, all stakeholders arc 
paying a lot of attention to sustainability issues. 
International literature shows that past efforts using subsidized and directed credit seem 
to have left a legacy of failed and unsustainable programmes that perpetually depended 
on donor and government funding. These early credit programmes constituted the 
subsidizing of bank loans to poor households in order to overcome the reluctance of 
banks to lend to collateral poor households. The loans were subsidised by the state and/or 
donors in order to make them affordable to low income households. Because the mission 
of the programmes was social , interest rates were also kept below market clearing leve ls 
(Morduch, 2000). Morduch further points out that default rates in these programmes were 
high because the loans were uncollaterised and some borrowers saw no need to pay back 
govenunent money. The losses due to non-payment were borne by the governments. 
Since banks were having problems recovering loans and were still subsidised by 
governments. they were not motivated to mobilise savings as an alternative source of 
finance for on lending (Ibid.). As a result, some banks ran out of money and closed the 
programmes altogether. One thus finds that these programmes, either ran out of money or 
they drained government coffers. 
~ Microfinance refers to financial services, which arc provided to low-income households and/or poor 
entrepreneurs. These services include credit, savings and insurance. Some insti tutions wi ll also provide 
non-financial services like training, group formation and counselling in order to build the capacity of their 
clients. 
2 
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Another negative consequence of government supported loan programmes was that they 
ended up mostly subsidi sing the well off and those with political connections (Morduch 
2000). In the encl. the poor did not benefit as much from government supported 
programmes. 
"Overall, the weaknesses of past efforts to reach small fanners and other priority groups 
have been in three 111ai11 areas: lending i11stitutio11s have not been financially viable and 
became quickly decapitalised; funds have not reached the intended target group; some 
programmes hare distorted the financial market and inte1fered with the evolution of 
finance for broad sectors of the economy". (USA.ID Evaluation Highl ights N0.49, June 
1995, online). 
/\nd so, despite the promise of reaching the poor, the subsidised credit progummcs of the 
past three decades failed almost universally and the disaster stories are well documented 
(Adams, Graham and Von Pischke, 1984 in Morduch, 2000). 
Due to the low success rate of govenm1ent and donor supported credit programmes, 
micro financing programmes and institutions came into being as a way of meeting the 
challenge of reaching poor clients in a more sustainable way. The new microfinance 
programmes set out to avoid the weaknesses of government programmes. These 
institutions however emerged after a lot of experimentation with product designs, and 
institutional structures. Morduch (2000) for example points out that "by employing 
3 
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contractual i1movations like group lending and by exploiting dynamic incentives, many 
programmes have achieved repayment rates above 95%". (Christen et al quoted in 
Morduch, 2000: 620). In the past two decades, microfinance institutions have 
concentrated on providing loans for microentcrprise acti vities. These institutions exist in 
various legal forms: NGOs, credit unions, non-bank financial intermediaries, various 
types of companies and of late some very success[ ul ones have evolved into registered 
commercial banks. 
1.1 Rationale of the Study 
There has been little research conducted in microfinance in Zambia. Interest in this area 
was minimal due to the small number of institutions until the mid-nineties. The few 
studies that have been conducted are mostly concerned with impact assessment. So far, to 
the best of my knowledge, no studies have been conducted in sustainab ility analysis 
although constraints faced by the industry have been alluded to in various studies and 
papers. Due to the ever- increasing number of microfinance institutions and heavy donor 
investment, research in sustainability has become imperative for the purpose of providing 
information both to the MFis and to stakeholders. A lot of policies and standards have 
been formu lated at international leve l by donors and other stakeholders to apply to a 
whole spectrum of institutions, regardless of where they are found . It is however 
becoming increasingly clear that regional and institutional characteristics need to be 
taken into consideration when microfinance policies and standards are made. This 
information can only be obtained by conducting research into institutions and populations 
4 
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served by these institutions. This will not only provide empirical information that can be 
used by stakeholders, but will also contribute to a bottom up analysis of issues. Most of 
the time the programmes have been donor driven because there has been little relevant 
information from the field. 
Literature shows that while initially the priority of microfinance was to provide financial 
services lo the poor. there has been an additional need to create financially sustainable 
• 
institutions with the capacity to continue servicing clients. It is assumed that the more 
financially sustainable the institution, the more poor people it will service. Morduch (2000) 
for example points out that by achieving financial sustainability and avoiding subsidies, 
microfinance institutions are expected to grow without the constraints imposed by donor 
budgets. In the process, these institutions are expected to serve more poor people than can 
be served by programmes fueled by subsidies. Literature shows that with regard to 
outreach, some clients reached by fi11a11cially viable institutions arc very small businesses 
that would not qualify for formal financial services. Some stud ies have in fact set out to 
test the premise that large numbers of poor people, including the very poor, can be 
reached with financial services tlu-ough financially viable institutions. One such study is 
the USAID Evaluation Highlights 1995 (online). According to this study, "contrary to 
expectations, outreach to the very poor did not appear to limit profitability because even 
institutions serving very poor clients could be financially viable". (USJ\ID Evaluation 
Highlights 1995 , online). 
5 
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In addition to being efficient or sustainable, a microfinance institution that meets these 
goals stands better chances of attracting more financial investment. This is because it can 
build trust among its clients, donors, and partners. 
There is a lot of encouragement being given for MFis to move towards sustainabil ity. 
Some donor organisations, the CGJ\P (Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest) in 
particular, have been instrumental in promoting best practices among Mfls for the 
purpose of making them sustainable (CGAP FocusNote No. 20, May 200 1 ). The best 
practices are performance standards that are meant to propel the institutions towards 
sustainability. Best practice includes, substantial client outreach, setting of economic 
rates of interest and Operational efficiency. Literature seems to suggest that successful 
MFis seem to have all of these factors in common. for example according to the USAID 
Evaluation llighlights (1995) study, the two keys to self-suffic iency are efficient 
operations and appropriate pricing policies (economic interest rates). Analysts also point 
out that there are external environmental factors impacting upon the sustainability of 
microfinance programmes. To this end Wenner and Chalmers (2001, online) assert that in 
the case of microfinance, analysis of sustainability will involve the examination of many 
variables including economic, regulatory, political and cultural. 
In spite of the emphasis on sustainability, it is evident that there are not many institutions 
that have reached full financial sustainability. For example, the most careful and 
comprehensive recent survey shows that the programmes that target the poorest borrowers 
generate revenues sufficient to cover just 70% of their full costs (Micro Banking Bulletin, 
6 
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r 
1998 quoted in Morduch 2000). Further evidence also shows that there are not only few 
financially sustainable MFls, but also that these were initially heavily subsidised before 
they became financially viable. One such institution is the Grameen bank, which has been 
widely used as a model of sustainability. Writing on the Grameen bank and sustainability, 
Shahidur, Khandker. Khalily and Khan ( 1995) point out that it is doubtful it could have 
generated enough revenue in the early years of it operation to cover costs. It is also 
unlikely that the rural poor would have been able to bear the full cost of Grameen bank 
services (Ibid.). 
Literature seems to suggest that sustainability is a process that begins with operational 
sustainability then moves on to financial sustainability as the institution develops. This is 
in fact true of any business undertaking because some investment has to be made initially 
before the business breaks even and begins to recover its costs. 
In view of this, it is imperative to conduct research on the sustainability of microfinance 
institutions in order to determine appropriate interventions and enable stakeholders to 
make informed decisions. This is even more important for the Zambian microfinance 
industry, which is relatively young and still needs to work at becoming sustainable. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
There are over 21 established microfinance institutions offering financial services in rural 
and peri-urban areas of Zambia (Mbulo, 2000). Microfinancing is a relatively new 
7 
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industry in Zambia because most of the MFls emerged only in the mid-nineti es (See 
Appendix 1 table 5). In fact both the government of Zambia and the donor community 
recognise that institutions for the delivery of micro finance in Zambia are still in the 
formative stage and that capacity bui lding is still required (Liato-Katundu and Nakalonga 
1999). There is a concern therefore that microfinance intermediaries need to be making 
significant progress in expanding client reach and market penetration (Ibid.). By way of 
best practice, therefore these institutions need to offer loans at a cost that will ensure cost 
recovery within a reasonable period of time. The financial performance of Mfls 
inevitably includes, decreasing dependence on subs idies and increasing financial self-
sufficiency. 
For the Zambian Mrls therefore, there needs to be a deliberate move on the part of the 
institutions to operate e fficiently by contro lling and recovering costs as well as by way of 
charging economic rate:; of interest. Given that these institutions operate in the broader 
economic. po litical and social environment, sustainability analysis inevitably includes an 
examination of the ex ternal factors affecting the sustainability of these institutions. 
1.3 Research Focus 
Due to time and other limitations discussed in the third chapter, this study focuses on one 
Zambian microfinance institution, Credit management Services Limited (CMS). The 
sustai nability of CMS w ill be analysed within the framework of sustainability set out in 
the literature i.e. , in terms of operational effi ciency, charging of economic rates o f 
8 
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interest and the level of client outreach. The national setting for microfinancc will also be 
analysed in terms of the constraints to sustainability. The study will reflect the 
characteristics of the institution, its clientele and the types of services it offers. The study 
will also analyse efficiency and sustainability levels of the institution. 
1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The primary aim of this study is to ascertain the sustainability of Credit Management 
Services Limited (CMS) within the broader context of the Zambian microfinance 
industry. This will be accomplished by examining CMS as an example of a microfinance 
institution in Zambia. The study will also discuss constraints that impact upon 
sustainability of microfinance institutions in Zambia and assess whether these pose a 
serious tlu-cat to the industry. Specific objectives of this study are: 
To examine the outreach leve ls of CMS and hindrances to client outreach. 
To establish whether CMS charges economic rates of interest and administrative charges 
that will enable it to recover costs. 
To determine the efficiency and sustainability levels of Credit Management Services 
(CMS). 
To examine the constraints that impinge on the sustainability of MFis in Zambia. 
9 
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To draw conclusions and make recommendations for stakeholders in micruftnance. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The study used two research designs to collect data from the fi eld namely: a 
questionnaire, which was used to collect information from the case study institution and a 
focus group discussion. The two designs were used in order to crosscheck data and to 
deal with possible gaps in information collected from the field. Primary data was 
collected through the use of a questionnaire, which was used to collect data from Credi t 
Management Services. The focus group discussion was conducted with the board of the 
Association for Microfinance Insti tutions of Zambia (AMIZ) to get a more representative 
view on the constraints affecting the sustainability of the industry as a whole. 
A literature survey of sel;oudary data was conducted in order to provide a theoretical an<l 
analytical framework for the study. The literature survey also provides experiences and 
performance of microfinance institutions globally. In addition, financial and operational 
records of Credi t management Services were examined in order to provide information 
relating to specific efficiency and sustainabi lity levels of the institution. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises of the following six chapters: 
10 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Chapter One- Introduction 
This chapter describes the basis of the current study. It presents the motivation for the 
study, statement of the research problem and its aims, the objectives and the research 
methodology. 
Chapter Two-The Sustainability Debate 
This is based on the review of literature and highlights current views on the subject of 
sustainability and how they are informed. It also presents the framework for analysis of 
sustainability and factors determining sustainability. It also to some extent critiques some 
studies which analyse sustainability. 
Chapter Three- Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter presents and explains in some detail the methodology used in the research 
and the kinds of data collected by the research instruments. It also presents sampling 
procedures and criteria as well as limitations of the study. 
11 
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Chapter 4 - Growth of Microfinance Institutions in Zambia and Constraints on 
SustainabiJity 
This chapter discusses the evolution of microfinance in Zambia and the experiences of 
microfinance institutions. It also sets out the types of MFis, the services they provide and 
the main constraints affecting the industry. 
Chapter Five- Presentation and Discussion of Results 
This chapter presents and analyses results from data collected from Credit Management 
Services. It presents background information on CMS. It then discusses target group 
characteristics, and economic activities. The chapter then analyses and interprets data 
with regard to client outreach. efficiency ratios and operational and financia l 
sustainability . 
Chapter Six- Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter draws conclusions from the mam findings m the research and makes 
recommendations to stakeholders in microfinance. 
12 
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CHAPTEH. TWO 
THE SUSTAINABILITY DEBATE 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter of the thesis puts the study topic in context and discusses sustainability and 
• 
its related concepts in the context of microfinancing. In order to appreciate the issue of 
sustainabi lity. this chapter begins by highlighting the purpose of microfinance as 
perceived globally. This is followed by a definition of sustainability and the two levels of 
sustainability namely, operational and financial sustainability. This discussion includes 
discussions on how the sustainability levels are calculated. This chapter further looks at 
the current sustainability debate and how experiences and performance of microfinanee 
institutions influence viewpoints. The two viewpoints in the debate are those of the 
'sustainability' camp and the 'poverty' camp although a section on other viewpoints is 
also presented. The last section of thi s chapter will discuss determinants of sustainability 
by way of looking at factors that bear upon the sustainability of microfinance institutions 
or progammes. It takes into consideration internal factors i.e., outreach levels, operational 
efficiency and interest rates (pricing policies). External fac tors refer to those in the 
external environment of the MFls. The chapter ends with a conclusion. 
13 
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2.1 The Purpose of Microfinance 
The central purpose of microfinancc is to provide large numbers of poor people, 
including the very poor and women w ith quality financial services, thereby reducing 
poverty. To thi s end, the microcredit summit of Feb 1997 held in Washington DC 
pledged itself to reach 100 million of the world ' s poorest families, especially the women 
of those families with credit for self-employment and other financial and business 
services by the year 2005 (Microcredit Summit, 1997, online). 
The core themes of the summit included: reaching the poorest and empowering women; 
building financially self-sufficient institutions; and ensuring a positive, measurable 
impact on the lives of the clients and their families. Building financially sustainable MFis 
is considered one of the critical components in the whole process of poverty reduction. 
To underline the importance attached to this theme, the Africa Region Microcre<lit 
Summit held in l larare in October 2000 had the theme, " Working towards institutional 
financial self-sufficiency while maintaining a commitment to serving the poorest 
families". Hence all stakeholders and partners in microfinance share more or less the 
same basic goal and that is, to provide micro finance services to large numbers of the poor 
in a sustainable way. 
More than just aspects of scale or large numbers, reaching the poor has aspects of 
reaching the very poor (normally referred to as depth of outreach), as well as meeting 
client needs (appropriateness of the services). 
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2.2 What is Sustainability? 
Sustainability encompasses several concepts and has been defined in different ways, 
depending on the discipline or development activity. In general terms however, 
sustainability means continuity, the ability to survive or be self-sustaining, with minimum 
or li ttle outs ide support. According to Edgcomb and Cawley ( 1993), it refers to the 
continuation o f acti vities a fter the project ends, often implies self-fi nancing and suggests 
that the Oow of bene fits will continue on the basis of the impetus and resources of local 
institutions. The term sustainability is also used synonymously with self-sufficiency. 
The concept " Program sustainability" means " the abil ity of a programme to continuously 
carry out activities and services in pursuit of its objectives .. . " (Shahidur, Khandker, 
Khalily, Khan. 1995:36) . This definition of sustainability docs not seem to imply 
financial sustainability per-se. But sustainability in this case is achieved so long as the 
institution continues to carry out its acti vities regardless of its source o f funding. This is 
not the current understanding of institutional sustainability as far as MFis are concerned. 
In the case of microfinance institutions or programmes, sustainability nowadays implies 
the ability of an institution or programme to sustain its own existence from its own 
revenue. Although currently sustainability is taken to be synonymous w ith the fi nancial 
viab ility o f an institution, it also important to note that within microfinance circles, still 
15 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
others assert that it goes beyond the issue of financial viability. According to Chua and 
Lian to ( 1996:7) for example, 
"it is the ability of the organisation to grow and adapt to changes. It is the ability to 
ensure the co11ti1111ity of its services, to expand and to adjust to changing circumstances. 
The issue of sustainability has to do with good leadership, organisation and strategic 
management ". 
Having estab lished the definition of sustainability in the context of micro finance, the next 
section defines and explains in detail the levels of sustainabili ty. 
2.3 Levels of Sustainability (self-sufficiency) 
There are essentiall y two levels uf sustainability namely, operati onal self-sufficiency and 
financial self-sufficiency. Financial self-sufficiency is synonymous w ith financial 
viability, which inevitably implies that the institution operates on business principles and 
makes a profit. (A fully subsidized institution depends entirely on grants and generates 
little or no revenue. An MFI operating at this level is like any other donor funded 
development program). Until they are full y self-sufficient all MFI receive or need some 
form of subsidy in order to carry out their operations . 
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2.3.1 Operational Self-sufficiency 
Operational sustainability is the ability of an institution to cover its operational costs from 
its own sources. J\ccord ing to Edgcomb and cawley (1993), Operational self-sufficiency 
is achieved when internall y generated income (from interest and fees) is equal to or 
greater than the expenses of operating a credit program. This would mean that salaries 
and administrative expenses are covered out of the institution 's revenues. At this level the 
MFl will still need to be partially subsidized. "Some institutions define operational self 
sufficiency as the ability to generate enough revenue to cover the MFls operating costs, 
financing costs and the provision for Loan losses". (Ledgerwood, 1999:2 17). Some MF!s 
exclude financ ing costs because they fund their loans from grants or collect savings and 
do not need to borrow money for onlending. As MFls move towards financial viabi lity, 
some of them are able to access capital from commercial banks and thus incur financing 
costs. In this definition, financing costs does nut include the cost of the original capital. 
Nevertheless, all Mfls incur operating expenses and the cost of making provision for 
loan losses. Ledgerwood ( 1999) presents t WO formulas for calculating operational sel r -
sufficiency: 
(i) Operational self-suffi ciency = Operating Income 
Operating Expenses + financing costs 
+ provision for loan losses 
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(ii) Operational Self Sufficiency = Operating Income 
Operating expenses + Provision for loan losses 
The second formula is preferable in the Zambian situation for example because currently, 
most institutions do not borrow money from commercial banks and do not therefore incur 
financing costs. Ledgerwood (1999) however points out that regardless o f which formula 
is used, if an MFI does not reach operational efficiency, eventually its loan fund capital 
(equity) will be reduced by losses leading to dccapitalisation. This could lead to closure 
of an institution unless additional grants are sourced, costs are reduced or interest rates 
are raised. This means that such institutions are not operationally sustainable. 
2.3.2 Financial Sustainability or Viability 
According to Ledgerwood ( 1999), financial sustainability (full self-sufficiency) means 
that an institution or programme is able to cover both the costs of operation, financial 
resources and financial costs from its profits. This entails that an institution operates on 
business principles and is therefore able to break-even and make a profit. Financial 
sustainability therefore indicates whether or not enough revenue has been earned to cover 
both direct costs, (including financing costs, provision for loan losses, and operating 
expenses) and indirect costs, including the adjusted cost of capital. 1 
1 The adjusted cost of capital is considered to be the cost of maintaining the value of the loan fund capital 
relat ive to inflation and the cost of accessing commercial rate liabilities rather than concessional loans. 
(Ledgerwood. 1999: 2 17). 
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The financial self- sufficiency ratio is calculated as follows: 
Financial self-sufficiency = Operating Income 
Operating expenses+ financing costs 
+ provision for losses+ cost of capital 
The above calculations will translate into a percentage or ratio used to indicate the level 
• 
of sustainability. financial sustainability is reached, when the ratio is l 00% or more. 
Unless this level is reached, the provision of financial services will continue to some 
extent to rely on subsidies. This calculation can also help to determine whether the 
programme requires financial subsidy given its cost of borrowing and how much.2 
Financial self-sufficiency is normally calculated on a non-subsidized basis. This means 
that for <lonur funded institutions, thi s would be calculated less the amount of the subsidy. 
2.4 The Subsidy Dependence Index 
fi nancial sustainability is ultimately determined by the extent to which an institution will 
continue to rely on grants or subsidies for its continued operation. A subsidy is money 
paid especially by the state or donors to help support organisations or to help reduce the 
costs of producing goods so that their prices can be kept low (Oxford Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary, Fifth Edition. 1995). With regard to Mfls, subsidies include: 
2 This criterion does not however capture the possibility that a programme that may not be viable now may 
still be financially viable over time. Analysis of sustainabi lity would therefore require further examination 
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donated equity, concessional loans from donors and central banks, and exemption from 
reserve requirements. 
The subsidy dependence index (SDl) is expressed as a ratio that indicates the percentage 
increase required in the onlcnding interest rate to completely eliminate all subsidies 
required in a given year (Ledgerwood, 1999). It is computed by dividing the total annual 
subsidy received by the average annual interest income. An SDI of I 00% indicates that 
the interest rate will have to be doubled in order to eliminate the subsidy. A 0% subsidy 
would indicate that an MFI has achieved financial sustainability. The subsidy dependency 
index is useful in compiling the total subsidy required by an MFI over time. It also 
enables analysts to compare the subsidy dependence of MFis providing similar services 
to similar clientele. 
2.5 The Sustainability Debate 
"The development of microfinance institutions over the last two decades has lent broad 
credence to the idea that microfinance is a major stimulus for development in the 
countries of the south, and a powerful instrument for combating poverty". (Chao-Beroff, 
1995, online). Based on this assumption, many microfinancc programmes have been 
designed and implemented in developing countries targeting poor populations. Inevitab ly, 
results have been varied in terms of experiences and performance of the MFis. 
Experiences and performance of lending institutions have been studied, and lessons 
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drawn from these have been used to determine general development policies with regard 
to microfinance almost universally. 
Broadly speaking in microfinance, there is an evident split between those in the 
'sustainability' camp advocating for financial sustainability as a means to poverty 
reduction, and those in the 'poverty' camp advocating for the prioritizing of social 
considerations ahead of sustainabi lity. Each camp has its own premise for their 
standpoint, which is now discussed below. 
2.5.1 The 'Sustainability' Camp 
Those in the sustainability camp hold that rnicrofinancing institutions have to be viable 
and work towards full financial sustainability otherwise they will not be able to service 
the poor they seek to serve. This viewpoint emphasizes that reaching the poor and 
sustainabi lity are two sides of the same coin, and that you cannot have one without the 
other. Sustainability serves outreach and vice versa. A conclusion is therefore made that 
"Only by achieving a high degree of sustainability have microfinance programs gained 
access to the funding they need overtime to serve significant numbers of their poverty 
level clients". (Rhyne, 1998:7). The focus of many in the sustainabili ty camp is therefore 
more on the scale of outreach (large numbers) rather than depth of outreach (reaching the 
poorest). Rhyne ( 1998) also points out that many in the sustainabil ity camp are more 
interested in opening access to the full spectrum of the poor who lack financial services. 
There is therefore a preference for mixed programs, which can become large and 
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sustainable lo small programs exclusively focusing on the poor. It is expected that in due 
course such large sustainable programmes will service even more of the poorest than the 
focussed ones, which are likely to become unsustainable anyway. 
The sustainability camp maintains that any future that continues dependence on donors 
and governments is a future in which few microfinance clients will be served (Ibid.). 
They maintain that donors and governments are prone to fatigue and may not subsidise 
microfinance indefinitely. As such they see the private sector as the futu re home of 
microfinance because it is able to mobilise and access commercial rate capital which is 
available all the time, as opposed to subsidies. It is perceived that, "Only the private 
sector has plenty of resources and will stick with a money making activity even if it is not 
in fashion". (Rhyne, 1998:2). 
Donor organizations have been particularly concerned about sustainability issues because 
of the heavy investment in microfinance. In particular, the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP), has been instrumental in supporting and promoting best practices. 
The CGAP is a donor consortium currently made up of about 27 donor organisations and 
is funded by the World Bank. Member organisations include: the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAlD), the World Bank, the Department for 
International Deve lopment (DFID), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
and The United nations Development Programme (UNDP). The formation of the CGAP 
is indicative of the Bank's interest in sponsoring microcredit programs to address 
poverty. 
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The objectives of CGAP are twofold, namely, increasing financial sustainability of MFis 
and deepening their poverty focus (CGAP FoeusNote No. 20, May 2001 ). The CGAP has 
been instrumental in promoting best practices among MFls for the purpose of making 
them sustainable. 
"The goal of breaking e1·e11, and thereby being able to liberate themselves from grant 
.funding within a reasonable period of time, has been set for microfinance programmes 
and this vel)' rapidly became the .fundamental orientation of microjinance 'best 
practice' ". (Chao-13eroff, 1999, on line). 
'Best Practice' normally refers to performance standards that micro finance institutions 
are expected to observe and adopt if they are to be sustainable and attract funding. "The 
term 'best practice' hence owes its origin to the World Bank and evokes the notion of 
optimal practices applicable anywhere". (Parhusip and Seibel, 1999, onlinc). Ranking 
high on the list of best practices are: 
- Substantial client outreach, 
- Charging of economic rates of interest and 
- Operational efficiency. 
To determine 'best practice' , the best and high performing institutions have been studied. 
This has been done with a view to avoiding bad, unsustainable practices and encouraging 
donors and governments to invest in institutions and programs that show the promise of 
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sustainability and thereby all eviating the most poverty, so to speak. /\s in most sectors, 
donors who wi ll also give conditions for providing support largely determine policies and 
standards in microfinance. Institutions are therefore obliged to observe 'best practice' in 
order to conform to global standards and attract support. 
Some of the Best Practices have been adopted from successful banks like the Grameen 
Bank. For example a study or the Grameen Bank commissioned by the World 13ank set 
out to examine the potential for expanding the Grameen bank in Bangladesh and 
replicating it elsewhere. The findings of the study were expected to have significant 
implications for development policy in general as well as for World Bank operations. 
(Shahidur, Khandker, Khalily, Khan. 1995). 
The USAID's Center for Development Information examined 11 successful micro 
enterprise finam.:t: programmes for the purpose of idcnti fying best practices. Only two 
programs out of the 11 examined were from Africa namely the Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Programme (K-REP), and the Agence de Credit pour I' Enterprise Privce'(ACEP) of 
Senegal. (See Appendix I table l for a full li st of institutions studied). The ages of 
institutions studied varied from 3 years (BRK Niger) to 40+ (BKD Indonesia) and client 
outreach covers both rural and urban areas (See appendix 1, table 1 ). This particular study 
set out to test the premise that large numbers of poor people, including the very poor, can 
be reached with financial services through financially viable institutions. According to 
this study, contrary to expectations, outreach to the very poor did not appear to limit 
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profitability because even institutions servmg very poor clients could be financiall y 
viable (USAlD Evaluation Highlights, 1995, online). 
Ten of the eleven institutions examined were operationally efficient and reached large 
numbers o f peop le w ith financial services while fi ve of the institutions were financially 
sustainable and yielded returns comparable to other financial institutions. The study 
concluded that the conventional thinking that microfinance cannot be sustainable is quite 
wrong and that " Microftnance institutions can and indeed need to be self sustaining if 
they are to achieve their outreach potential-providing rapid growth in access to financial 
services by poor people". (Ibid .) 
With regard to depth of outreach, study results show that clients reached by these 
institutions are very sma ll businesses that would not qualify for formal financial services. 
The very poor were reached by all except one of these institutions. Moreover, these 
institutions reach large numbers o f women because women tend to go for smaller loan 
sizes. Several of the institutions have achieved maj or coverage on a national level. For 
example, the Grameen bank's market outreach covers almost half the villages in 
Bangladesh reaching 1.8 million poor clients. The BRI Unit Desa in Indonesia has more 
than 2 million borrowers and 12 million savers while some programmes have expanded 
very rapidly in terms of outreach with rates ranging from 25% to 100% per year (Ibid.). 
The rapid growth in client outreach was associated with the ability to maintain financial 
viability. 
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In this study, indicators of strong client demand were growth in the number of borrowers, 
the loan portfolio and savings deposits. Clients were also willing to pay interest rates 
above the rate of inflation and repay loans on a timely basis (evidenced in low 
delinquency rates). Some very large programmes have amongst the smallest loan sizes. 
Mixed programmes that serve a range of clients (not just those of a given loan size) have 
successfully reached very poor clients. A conclusion is also made that it is scale and not 
exclusive focus that determines whether significant outreach to the poor will occur 
(Ibid.). 
According to the US/\10 Evaluation l lighlights ( 1995) study, the two keys to self-
sufficiency are efficient operations and appropriate pricing policies. The study concludes 
that viability is not the direct result of context, culture, or target groups. This apparently 
is in direct contrast to a claim made by Wenner and Chalmers (2001) who point out that, 
"examining why a certain industry has flourished more in one region than the other 
always involves analysing many variables. In the case of microfinance, the explanatory 
factors range from economic to regulatory to political and cultural". (Wenner and 
Chalmers on line, 200 l ). I tend to agree with the latter view because it takes into 
consideration that MFls operate m varying contexts. Hence it is more reasonable to 
expect that a whole range of variables will impact upon sustainability. 
Morduch (2000) commenting on the effect of successful program points out that these 
successes have bred false generalisations such as " Subsidization, inefficiency, and 
limited scale necessarily go hand in hand .... government involvement means trouble. 
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EfTective savmgs mobilization is incompatible with subsidised credit". (Morduch 
2000:620). These ideas are however not necessarily consistent with logic or experience. 
2.5.2 The 'Poverty' Camp 
Those in the poverty camp are of the view that micro enterprise finance helps poor people 
and therefore is a desirable development activity but that it cannot be financially viable 
(USAID Evaluation Highlights, 1995, online). Currently the view is that sustainability is 
necessary but it must not be pursued at the expense of reaching the poor. This thinking 
emanates from what is currently happening on the ground with regard to institutional 
sustainability. 
Morduch (2000) points out that in spite of being aware of best practices, nearly all 
programs remain substantially subsidized, especially those with social objectives. The 
most recent surveys show that NGO programs targeting the poorest borrowers generate 
revenues to cover just 70% of their full costs (Morduch 2000 quoting the Micro banking 
bulletin 1998). According toMorduch, most programs are not moving towards financial 
sustainability quickly because micro finance best practice is not so easy to implement on 
the ground . This supports an earlier observation by Edgcomb and Cawley ( 1993) that a 
number of programmes have approached and reached the operational self-sufficiency 
level, yet only a few have attained the financial self-sufficiency level because of the need 
to have a very high volume of clients and a highly market oriented approach. 
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Most of the lessons from this camp have been drawn from institutions deli vcring credit in 
disadvantaged areas particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. A study conducted in 1999 on 
'constraints associated with developing sustainable rural financing systems in 
disadvantaged rural areas in Africa' highlights challenges specifically associated with 
providing credit in rural Africa Chao-Bero ff ( 1999, online) points out that it is difficult 
for MFls to break even in Sub-Saharan Africa because of high transaction costs. 
Transaction costs tend to be high because of a combination of the fol lowing factors: 
Managing large numbers of small loans which need substantial costs to issue and 
monitor in any context. 
The dispersion of the population (low density, long distances between villages, 
poor state of roads) which leads to more travel time and costs. 
High wages as compared to the ratios for the same positions in Asia from which 
the model draws its inspiration. 
High costs of a centralized system. 
According to Chao-Beroff (1999) an increase in revenue can only be achieved in two 
main ways, which are also subject to severe limitations in disadvantaged areas. An 
increase in interest rates or an increase in the volume of loans. (/\n alternative may also 
be a decrease in salaries paid which tends to have legal implications most organisations 
would rather avoid). An increase in interest rates could lead to competition with other 
subsidised programs and the possibility of a programme pricing itself out o f the market. 
An increase in the volume of loans requires expansion into new areas thereby increasing 
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costs for the institution. In fact thi s is a universal concern and was also an issue for the 
Africa Region Microcredit Summit (ARMS) held in Harare in October 2000. The 
Challenge faced is how to maintain financial viability while expanding outreach to the 
poor. The summit observed that at a practical level this is possible but very difficult, to 
the extent that there are going to be very few of such sustainable financia l institutions 
working with the poor (final Report of the Afri ca Region Microcredit Summit. May 
200 1). 
This study pointed out that previous financial projections showed that the network as a 
whole would obtain the break-even point on ly by 2004/2005, or some 15 years after the 
start up of the projects, and only a fter a significant expansion into new areas (Chao-
Beroff, 1999, online). On the other hand Chao-Beroff (1999) points out that it was just 
such significant expansions that gave rise to the crises in the first place. An awareness of 
the structural difficulties associated with breaking-even came with the fi rst major cri ses, 
which were rcnected in the fi eld by a disturbing leve l of delinquency, cases of fraud, and 
sometimes also by localized Union conflicts (Ibid.). Institutions cited the following as 
causes of the crises: 
- Pressure from donors to increase volume of operations so as to break even quickly. 
Pressure to attain national coverage and the establishment of operations in 
specific zones by donors and the state, as well as the difficulty of res isting 
markets. 
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Saturation of markets with certain products leading to a drop in selling prices and 
difficulties in repaying loans. 
Emergence of strong competition (some institutions had zero or very minimum 
rates of interest so clients shunned institutions with higher rates). 
Political interference particularly during election times. 
These institutions as a result of their experiences are now entering a phase of reviewing 
the choices made and are searching for new so lutions. Donors also need to rethink. 
In comparison to the Asian context where MFJs are most sustainable, the scenario is quite 
different. According to the World Bank, Asia has the highest microfinance activities and 
fastest growing institutions compared to Latin America and Africa (Mutalima, 2000 
quoting World Bank, 1996:29). Asia's high performance is attributed to the enabling 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment, and a notably higher population density. 
Speaking of Cambodia for example, the rural areas arc not isolated in the geographical 
sense of the term, and the average population density is 156 people per square km as 
compared to 15 in Guinea and Burkina Faso in Africa (Chao-Beroff, 1999, on line). 
Consequently the distances between vi llages are such that it is possible to go from one 
village leve l institution to another in less than half a day. J\ study of the Grameen Bank 
points out that its success has partly been dependent on its low percentage of defaulters 
(Shahidur, Khandker, Khalily, Khan. 1995). " Analysis of branch data for overdue loans 
suggests that loca l development indicators such as roads, electrification and education 
infrastructure and branch characteristics such as age and manager' s incentives inOuence 
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loan repayment performance". (lbid:36). The study concluded that bad loans arc therefore 
not an e1n tic behavior of certain borrowers, they are also dependent on both demand and 
supply side factors determining the volume of lending. 
2.5.3 Omissions in Sustainability Studies 
There are, however, some important omissions in the studies conducted to determine best 
practice, and it is that they have not critically analysed and compared client 
characteristics that can impact on sustainab ility. Morduch (200 l ) points out that client 
characteristics differ from region to region. He observes that some clients arc traders 
making a high rate of return on investments, others have to invest in longer-term 
investments li ke li vestock farming, agricultural process ing and handicrafts. I ligh costs o f 
borrowing for the later group of clients w ill put financial services out of their reach. This 
is because they w ill be required to pay back the loan before they earn adequate returns on 
investments. Because of this scenario, those in the sustainabi lity camp would argue that 
clients who are unable to pay high interest rates are destitute and need social programs 
like health and education. 
According to Morduch (2000:6 18), "confronting the schism between rhetoric and action-
and between financially minded donors and sociall y minded programs will fi rst of all 
require that both donors and practitioners pay greater attention to who is being served". 
There is a need to analyse cl ient characteristics by occupation, loan use, and income 
level. The call to best practice can only be convincing if the fi nancially viable institutions 
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are serving clients w ith pro files similar to those of socially minded institutions. There is 
also a great need to make cross-country comparisons of other local situations such as 
populati on densities and cultures. Many studies that have been used as a basis for 
determining best practice have not included client profiles and other comparisons. The 
studies do not provide comparable and reliable evidence like incomes, occupati ons and 
loan sizes of clients and of comparab le non-participants. Morduch (2000) points out that 
there is onl y one study that provided thi s information conducted by I lulme and Mosley 
( 1996). This concern for lack of empirical data on client profiles is confirmed by Rhyne 
( 1998:8): " we still know very little about the poverty level of clients in various 
microfinance programs, and we still rely on loan size as the only readil y available proxy 
fo r client poverty level". 
In my view. if comparisons between sustainable and unsustainable institutions are made 
without compari11g client stat istics, the comparisons arc not fa ir. 
2.5.4 Other Viewpoints 
The above two view-points are not the only ones. There are still other analysts who assert 
that microfinance does not necessarily serve the poor. lt is indicated that " Although 
microfinance can reduce poverty, the benefits are directly re lated to the level of poverty 
so that they disproportionately accrue to the middle poor in society while the poorest 
receive li ttle benefit". (Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) quoted in Bonti-Ankomah and C hamba 
2000:8). Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) further argue that micro finance on its own may not 
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be an e ffective too l in reducing poverty, and may particularly be inappropriate for the 
poorest in society (Ibid). This view is even partly supported by empirical evidence (put 
forward by the susta inability camp) which shows that the most sustainable programmes 
arc those serving a mixed range of clients as opposed lo those targeting the poorest. For 
example, according to RJ1yne ( 1998), the focus of many in the sustainability camp is 
more on the scale o f outreach (large numbers) rather than depth of outreach (reaching the 
poorest) . In my view, the only difference is that the sustainabili ty camp argues that mixed 
programs ultimately serve the poorest because they are sustainable. 
2.6 Determinants of Sustainability 
The above debate raises a question as lo what really determines institutional 
sustainability. Evidently, there are various factors determining sustainability. Generally, 
since sustainability is synonymous with the profitabi lity or viab ility of any given 
institution. various factors w ill impact upon it. According to USJ\JD Evaluation 
Highlights ( I 995), factors include: I. Volume of business (scale of client outreach), 2. 
Pricing policies, which is dependent on the ability of the institutions to operate on 
business principles. This is basically the ability of the institution to charge interest rates 
that recover costs. 3. Efficient operations evidenced in keeping all costs low (an 
expensive structure eats into profits). 
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2.6.1 Scale of Outreach 
The higher the scale of outreach the higher the revenue reached depending on the size of 
loans. An Mfl needs to have a certain pre-determined number of clients to enable it to 
reach economics of scale and break even. A failure to scale up will result in high costs 
and eventual loss in revenue. 
2.6.2 Interest rntes 
Given that the scale of outreach is significant, the most critical of the above three factors 
is setting of economic rates of interest. The above USAID study of the 11 institutions 
revealed that the most viable institutions differed from the less viable in their willingness 
to set interest rates at leve ls that would fully cover costs. The less viable held down 
interest rates and remained subsidy Jcpend1.::nt. For example Corposol (Colombia) a 
financially viable program charged an effective real rate of interest of 52 percent per 
annum while K-REP (Kenya) charged negative 9 percent which was the lowest rate of the 
sample (See table 2. Appendix 1). If a programme charges uneconomic rates, it inevitably 
subsidises interest rates. A prioritisation of soc ial above sustainability goals would imply 
that the poor cannot pay economic rates of interest. An increase in interest rates may not 
lead to decreased demand of the financial product unless of course there was competition 
in which case clients opt for the cheaper loans, given that a significant number of factors 
remain equal. 
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2.6.3. Efficiency of Operations 
With regard to maintaining efficiency3 or operations, it fo llows logically that the lower 
the costs of an institution, the more profitable it will be. ror example, in the above study, 
programmes like FINCA, BKDs and Grameen that used local personell to staff their 
operations were more profitable. Others like ADOPEM, K-REP and BRK (Niger) with 
significantly higher salaries had less cost advantage (USAID Evaluation I ligblights No. 
49. June 1995 online. 11/09/0l). 
Efficiency is normally measured in terms of ratios, which measure the cost of providing 
services in form of loans to generate revenue. These arc referred to as operating costs and 
should include neither financing costs nor loan loss provisions (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Mfls that provide savings have higher operating costs than those offering savings only. 
This is so because additional operating costs are incurred to collect savings deposits. So 
the comparisons should not be made between MFis offering different services unless a 
kind of leveling off is made. 
Two key factors tend to influence the level of activity and hence operating costs and 
efficiency, i.e. , turnover of the loan portfolio and the average loan size (Bartel, McCord, 
and Bell, 1995 quoted in Ledgerwood, 1999). The efficiency of operations can therefore 
be analysed by looking at operating costs as a percentage of portfolio outstanding and at 
3 Efficiency is de lined as the ability to maximize output per unit of input. Operational indicators would 
include the ratio of staff to clients, staff to loan amounts, and costs per unit of output such as number and 
amount of loans released. (Chua and Llanto 1996:6) 
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the costs associated with lending on per unit of currency basis or per loan basis 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
2.6.4 Operating Cost ratio 
This provides an indication of the effi ciency of the lending operations. This is affected by 
increasing or decreasing operational costs relati ve to the average portfolio. 
Operating Cost Ratio = Operating Costs 
Average Portfolio Outstanding 
An observati on is also made that successful MFI tend to have operating cost ratios of 
between 13 and 2 1 percent of the ir average loan portfolios and between 5 and I G percent 
of their average tut<d assets (Christen ct al, 1995 quoted in Ledgerwood, 1999). 
2.6.5 Other Operational Efficiency Ratios 
Ledgerwood ( 1999) also puts forward the following effi ciency ratios that are used to 
further analyse operating efficiency: 
1. Salaries and Benefits to Average portfolio Outstanding 
Successful MFis have salaries and benefits running between 4 percent and 16 percent of 
average portfolio outstanding (Christen ET al , 1995 quoted in Ledgerwood, 1999). When 
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making comparisons though, there is a need to consider the credit methodology, density 
of population, and the salary levels in a particular country. 
Salaries and bene fits to Average portfolio outstanding = Salaries and benefits/ J\ verage 
portfo lio outstanding. 
2. Cost per Unit of Currency Lent 
This reflects the impact of the turnover or the loan portfolio on operating costs. A.gain the 
lower the ratio, the higher the efficiency. J\ considerati on needs to be made with regard to 
the term of the loans. Short-term loans will reflect lower costs than long-term loans of the 
same portfolio disbursed. 
Cost per Unit of Currency lent = Operating costs for the period/ Total amount disbursed 
in the period. 
3. Cost Per Loan Made 
This ratio provides an indication of the cost of providing loans based on the number of 
loans made. This is expressed as: 
Cost per loan = Operating costs for the period/ Total number of loans made in the period. 
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A Jot of care however needs to be taken when making these calculations. As Ledgerwood 
( 1999) points out, " It is difficult to compare efficiency ratios among Mfls because the 
average loan size and loan term are so significant in these calculations". (Ledgerwood, 
1999:2 14). For example, relatively larger loans will result in lower costs per unit or 
currency lent or cost per loan made ratios than smaller loans. In add ition, lending to 
groups is relatively cheaper than lending to individuals. Inevitab ly, lending models also 
have an impact. As a result the ratios are deemed to be more benefic ial for internal 
financial management than for comparison purposes. 
The above are the factors directly influencing financial sustainabi lity, 'other things being 
equal'. However. in the real world, all things are not equal and a lot of factors come to 
bear either directly or indirectly on the viability of institutions. Some of these factors are 
very real as in the African context and may not be glossed over. Extremes are however to 
be avoidt::d. CGAP f ocusNote No.20 (May 200 I) for example summarises some 
conditions where credit wi ll be unsustainable as follows: 
- In severely disadvantaged rural areas lacking infrastructure, services and or access to 
markets. 
- A population so dispersed that it is too costly to reach clients on a regular basis. 
- Dependence on a single economic activity such as a single agricultural crop. 
- Reliance on barter as opposed to cash transactions. 
- A population with a high degree of mobility or instability. 
- Likelihood of future crises such as civi l disorder, natural disasters and hyperinflation. 
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- Lack of social cohesion that can undermine the use of non-collateral credit 
methodologies like group lending. 
- A legal/regulatory framework that constitutes a barrier to microfinance activities. 
Thus factors affecting efficiency will include both direct and indirect inOucnces. 
Although these may be w idely debated, there is empirical evidence to show they impact 
sustainability. (/\s shown in the studies alluded to in the above poverty/sustainability 
debate). 
2.7 Conclusion 
Fundamentally, the 'susta inability camp' and the 'poverty camp' seem to differ on 
whether or not to subsidise the Mfls and the length of time they should be subsidized. 
The 'sustainability 1.:amp' pushes for financial sustainability al most regardless of who is 
being served while the poverty camp advances the social mission of reaching the poorest 
as a priority. But it is also evident that MFis need subsidies in order to develop into 
institutions that are capable of delivering cred it on a sustainable basis. Li terature shows 
that there are few financially sustainable microfinance institutions in the world and that 
even the best of these have reached financial sustainability after substantial subsidisation. 
The main reason for this is that best practice is not easily translated into practice on the 
ground because of the varying conditions under which MFis operate . 
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Concluding from literature on experience around the world, the delivery of credit to a 
broad spectrum of poor clients is more sustainable than that directed at the poorest. 
Serving poor clients implies higher costs and risks for lenders because small loans arc 
more expensive to administer and yield relatively lower returns on investment for the 
MFis. Microfinance therefo re does not necessarily serve the poorest and is not always the 
most appropriate tool for poverty alleviation. In fac t other programmes may be more 
appropriate as long as in the end they wi ll contribute towards enabl ing the poor have 
access to or build an asset base to enable them engage in productive economic activities. 
Alternatively stakeholders have to make a choice between focussing on the not so poor 
areas and obtain significant results that become apparent quickly or, to invest in remote 
areas where the cost will be much higher and the results will be seen only after a longer 
period of time. (Chao-Bero ff, 1999, online ). 
Clearly, to me, sustainability is affected by both internal and environmental factors . I 
agree with analysts who point out that it partly depends on both the supply side and the 
demand side factors determining the vo lume of lending. While efficient operations and 
appropriate pricing policies are critical , one may not ignore fo r example, geographical 
and socio-economic contexts in which some programmes operate. On this point I 
disagree with those in the sustainability camp who make a conclusion that sustainability 
is not a direct result of context, culture or target groups. I am of the opinion that 
individual cases of MFls should be analysed and treated as such, because programmes 
operate in areas of varied cultural, economic and geographical characteristics. Therefore 
consideration needs to be given to these regional differences. 
40 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
The biggest challenge that remains is to draw appropriate lessons from the mistakes of 
the past as well as the successes of the high performing MF!s. It seems the most 
important lesson to be learned from past failures is the need for operational efficiency and 
appropriate pricing policies. The lessons provided seem to me to point to the fact that 
after all is said and done , the path to fo llow is that of moving towards financial 
sustainability. This should however be done with minimum pressure from donors and 
governm ents in order to allow for local adaptations of best practices as well as varying 
time periods for reaching sustainability. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the sustainability debate, which highlighted the 
• 
viewpoints on sustainability, how they arc formed and how they affect the formulation of 
microfinance standards and best practice. A discussion of the concept of sustainabil ity 
and factors determining sustainability was presented and the framework for analysis of 
sustainability set out. This chapter presents the methodology of the study. It focuses on 
the following: study design and rationale, selection of case study, data collection methods 
and limitations of the research methodology. 
3.1 Study Design and Rationale 
The study used two research designs namely: a questionnaire, which was used to collect 
information from the case study institution and a focus group discussion. The focus group 
discussion was conducted with board members of the Association of Microfinance 
Institutions of Zambia (AMIZ). This was done as a means of supplementing information 
and explaining some of the responses emanating from the case study through the 
questionnaire. A list showing the names of the board members and the institutions they 
represent is attached as appendix three (3). 
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3.2 Methodology 
The nature of this study entailed the use of both pnmary and secondary sources of 
information. It also entailed the use of both qualitative and quantitative analysis of data. 
3.2.1 Primary Data 
Primary information was obtained through an interviewer-administered questionnaire 
(see Appendix 2). The other was the focus group discussion. The questionnaire allowed 
for a close examination of Credit Management services (CMS) and was used to elicit the 
fo llowing in formation: 
- Nature of tht: organisation 
- Services o ffered by the institution 
- Characteristics of the clients and general target group baselines 
- Client Outreach and hindrances to increased client outreach 
- Interest rates and fees charged 
- Operational e fficiency 
- Operational sustainability 
- Financial sustainability ratios. 
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The focus group discussion with the board members was conducted in order to get an 
overall picture of the constraints affecting the sustainability of the industry. This was 
done as a means o r supplementing and explaining some of the responses emanating from 
the institution via the questionnaire. The focus group discussion allowed for the 
participation o r practitioners who are directly invo lved in managing microfina11ce 
institutions and could give an insider view po int. Specific issues discussed were as 
follows: 
- Constrai nts in obtaining scale o f client outreach 
- Interest rates and fees charged and determining factors 
- Cost of Operations and what leads to high costs 
- External constraints impinging on sustainability 
3.2.2 Sccomlary Data 
This research uses secondary data from previous research, books and topical articl es in 
journals and the institution's reports and documents. Collection of secondary data 
entailed an extensive survey of literature in order to appreciate the conceptual and 
theoretical framework of sustainability, the current debates and actual factors determining 
sustainability. Literature survey also provided data on the history and experience of 
m icrofi nance in Zambia. 
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Quantitative analysis of data was used to calculate the operationai and financial 
sustainability of CMS. Raw data was collected via audited financial statements for three 
consecutive years l 999, 2000, and 200 l. Efficiency and sustainability ratios for the years 
1999, 2000, and 200 l were calculated by me based on the audited financial reports to 
allow for analys is of trends (see Appendix 4 ). 
3.3 Selection of Case Study Institution 
The study initially set out to study four institutions with the highest client outreach. This 
was not possible due to time constraints because the study actually entailed spending a lot 
of time with the organisations. But more, important, it turned out that institutions were 
not willing to provide information relating to financial performance. Three institutions 
were eventually surveyed but only one, Credit Management Services (CMS) could 
provide financial data tu allow for in depth analysis of efficiency and sustainability. 
Hence the study had to be narrowed down to one institution. 
An MFI membership list was obtained from the Association of Microfinance 
organisations in Zambia. (Attached as appendix 1. Table 3). The List shows outreach 
activities of Mfls including the number of clients served as at Dec. 2001. Only 
organisation with a high client base needed to be chosen. This allows for analysis of 
sustainability because the institutions have a full cost structure and are already getting 
some revenue. This allows for calculation of efficiency ratios, operational sustainability 
and financial sustainability. 
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3.4 Testing of questionnaire 
Although a test case was not planned for initially, the questionnaire had to be adjusted 
after the survey of the first institution. This helped to ensure clarity and relevance of 
questions. It was also at this stage that the focus group discussion was found to be 
relevant as a tool of data collection. Although the test institution could not provide data 
on financial performance, the questionnaire was reliable enough to co llect the rest of the 
information needed. 
3.5 Limitations of the Research Methods 
The study was limited by time constraints that hindered interaction with the potential 
insti tutions in the field. Approximate time spent in the fi eld was about two weeks. This 
time period could have been shorter but it was not possible to get all the information in 
one sitting because the information had to come from various sources within the 
organisation. Arrangements also had to be made for the focus group discussion 
It was difficult to get all the data relevant to the research because apparently, some 
institutions have not developed their Management Information Systems (MIS) as to 
portray accurate data on loan performance, sustainability and effi ciency ratios. This 
problem is also alluded to by Mbulo (2000) who points out that MIS for M Fls are not 
well developed hence the need for exposure to what well established Mfls are using. But 
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more important than this, there were transparency problems because the study also 
inevitably included what some institutions perceived as sensitive because determining 
sustainability levels indirectly involves discussing efficiency and cost effectiveness of 
operations. The problem of transparency in some MFI is also alluded to by Morduch 
(200 I) as one of the problems affecting the sustainability of MFls. ln fact, this problem 
largely contributed to the narrowing down of the study to Credit Management Services 
(CMS), which was willing to provide all the info rmation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GROWTH OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN ZAMBIA AND 
CONSTRAINTS AJrFECTING TllEIR SUSTAINABILITY 
4.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the research design, data collection methods and the 
limitations of the research methods. This chapter presents the background of how the 
microfinance industry has emerged and grown in Zambia and discusses constraints 
impinging on sustainability of Zambian MFls. Understanding the historical background 
of micro finance is important in this study because it gives the reader some appreciation of 
sustainabi lity issues. The discussion therefore begins with the history of subsidised credit 
in Zambia and then looks at how microfinance as we know it today has emerged. 
Following this is a brief discussion of the institutional types as well as the services 
offered by the institutions. After this the constraints faced by the industry are discussed. 
The constraints are discussed both in terms of internal and external factors. Internal 
factors are those that can be directly controlled by the MFls, whi le external factors are 
those that the MFls have little or no control over. The discuss ion is largely based on 
various research reports and articles dealing with microfinance in Zambia and the foc us 
group discussion held with the board members of the Association of Microfinance 
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Institutions of Zambia (AMIZ). The results of the focus group discussion as well as the 
names of the board members in attendance are attached as Appendix 3. 
4.1 Background of Micro Credit 
4.1.1 History of Micro Credit 
Supervised and targeted microcred it in Zambia dates back to colonial times in the l 950 's 
when the Colonial government provided credit to small-scale farmers through the Land 
Bank (Mbanacele 2000). After independence, during the mid-sixties, the new Zambian 
government started to set up a number of financial institutions to cater for the needs of 
small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs. The Credit Organisation (COZ) of Zambia was set 
up to replace the Land Bank to provide credit. It was however declared bankrupt because 
the government could not recover the loans and its functions were taken over by the 
Agricultural Finance Company (AFC). 
On assessing the administrative capacity of the Arc, Mbulo ( 1990) observed that, " the 
AFC failed to reconcile social objectives and commercial objecti ves as it was expected to 
provide seasonal loans to small scale farmers as long as they were recommended by 
government agricultural extension officers" . (Mbulo quoted in Banda 1993: 11 ). The 
Agricultural finance company was later merged with the Zambia Agricultural 
Development Limited (ZADL) which was formed to cater for commercial farmers. The 
company that emerged was called Lima bank. The Small Industries Organisation (SIDO), 
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the Village industries Services (VIS) and the Small Enterprises Promotion (SEP) were 
created to cater for the small and medium enterprise (SME) sectors ( Mbanacele 2000). 
Other institutions set up were the credit Union and Savings Association (CUSJ\) and the 
Zambia Cooperati ve Federation (ZCF) which were basically member based. J\ 11 these 
institutions were government supported and/or controlled. 
Like other subsidised credit interventions worldwide these organisati ons fa iled due to 
liquidi ty and sustainability problems. Amongst the problems faced by these insti tutions 
were: poor loan recoveries resulting from a poor credit culture, inadequate government 
funding, political interference and poor marketing policies for agricultural produce. 
4.1.2 Emergence and Growth of Microfinancc Institutions 
The Structural Adjustment Programme introduced in 199 1 through the World Bank led to 
privatisation of state owned industries. J\ lo t of state-owned industries including the 
lending institutions, collapsed due to insolvency problems. The collapse of industries led 
to a high rate o f unemployment and consequently high poverty levels. As a means of 
contributing to poverty reduction, the private sector and Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) have intervened and sought ways of providing microfinance to the 
ever-growing info rmal sector. Thus, the vacuum created by the collapse of government 
supported lending institutions is being filled. 
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According to Mbulo (2000) there is considerable evidence that the demand for 
microcredit is unmet in Zambia due to the fact that there are a lot of poor famil ies whose 
household expenditure depends entirely on income generated from microenterpri scs. As a 
consequence, the number of Mrls is increasing. This assertion is supported by broader 
literature on the relationship between poverty levels and level of microfinance activities. 
For example, in explaining why microfinance seems to have thr ived more in Latin 
America than the Anglophone Carri bean, Wenner and Chalmers on line (200 I ) observe 
·that, "Microfinance tends to thrive 111 countries with high rates of 
unemployment/underemployment, high rates of poverty, and high degrees of inequality in 
access to basic services and government transfer programs". In such circumstances, the 
authors point out that many of the unemployed have no choice but to pursue se lf-
employment or wage employment in the informal economy. The larger the informal 
sector the more li kely it is that micro finance will be viable. They further point out that the 
Anglophone Carri bean has less micro entrepreneurs per l 00,000 inhabitants than Latin 
America. The lesser degree of poverty in the Anglophone Carribean docs not create a 
sense of urgency to access credit. 
S ince 1992, a number of institutions have sprung up in order to provide credit to the poor. 
Microfinancing is thus a relatively new industry in Zambia. (Dates of fo rmation of MFls 
in Zambia are tabled in Appendix I table five). Nakalonga and Liato-Katunclu ( 1999) 
observe that both the government of Zambia and the donor community recognise that 
institutions for the delivery of micro fi nance in Zambia are still in the formative stage and 
that capacity building is still required. Examples o f capacities needing to be built include: 
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a sound governing structure; competent and stable local staff; a strong business plan for 
expansion and sustainability as well as the development and usage of accurate 
Management Information Systems (MIS). The need to develop a mission and a vision is 
also critical for creating a sense of purpose, ownership and accountability by both the 
organisations and their clients. 
In Zambia, the government and donors are also concerned that microfinancc should be 
targeted at the poor. The donor community is therefore also interested in microfinance 
intermediaries making significant progress in expanding client reach and market 
penetration (Nakalonga and Liato-Katundu 1999). Donors are also interested in the 
financial performance of MFls. There is need to off er loans at a cost that will ensure cost 
recovery within a reasonable period of time. As such, part of the required financial 
performance includes decreasing dependence on subsidies and increas ing financial self-
sufficicncy. 
4.2. Types of MFls 
There are over 21 established microfinance institutions offering financial services in rural 
and peri-urban areas of Zambia (Mbulo. 2000). The industry of practicing MFis is 
composed of Local private organisations in the form of companies, international and 
local NGOs, Co-operatives, Associations and projects. The companies are registered 
under the Companies Act and offer their services for profit and are usually wholly 
Zambian owned. The NGOs are a mix of local and international NGOs mostly operating 
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as non-profit making organisations. The Co-operatives and Associations arc mcmbcr-
based organisations like the Women's finance Co-operative of Zambia Limited. Some 
selected government institutions like the Credit and Savings Bank of Zambia and the 
National Trust rund for the Disabled (NTFD) also offer microfinance services. A list 
showing outreach of major MFls includes types of MFis in Zambia and is attached as 
Appendix I Table 3. 
Institutions giving support to the sector include the Micro bankers' Trust (MBT), and the 
Association of Microfinance institutions in Zambia AMIZ. The Micro Bankers' Trust is 
the biggest microcredit wholesaling institution providing wholesale credit lo MFis. The 
MBT was initially established to implement the ' Micro Credit Delivery for the 
Empowerment of the Poor'. This programme was largely supported by the European 
Union and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS). 
Apart from providing wholesale credit, the MBT also provides capacity building in form 
of business planning and development of MIS to client organisations. As at June 2000, 
the MBT also started lending directly to groups. AMIZ was formed in 1998 to provide 
services to its member organisations. Objectives of the Association include strengthening 
of lateral learning among its members ; support of best practices and innovative 
techniques; information dissemination and sharing; establishment of a national 
defaulters' register; advocacy and lobbying. The aim of the association is basically to 
improve the Zambian financial sector providing services to poor entrepreneurs. 
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4.3 Services Provided by MFls 
Most MFis use the group lending methodology adapted from the Gramecn Bank model , 
al though the systems differ from one microfinance institution to another (Mbulo 2000). 
Services offered by the MFls include credit, training and savings mobilisation. The 
savings are mostly collected as a guarantee against default by group members. They are 
compulsory as opposed to voluntary. These moneys are given back to group members if 
there is no default. They are not available as capital for on-lending because in essence 
they do not belong to the institutions and legally, the MFis are not allowed to take 
savings per se from the public. This is a disadvantage because it limits capital for on 
lending to donor funds and for companies, to shareholders equity only. The practice of 
compulsory savings is however expected to cultivate a culture of saving in the clients. 
The size of loans differ but range from a low of KS0,000 (US$ 12.50) for a first loan to a 
maximum of K2.5 million (US$ 625) for a subsequent loan (Ibid.) 
4.4 Constraints Affecting Sustainability of MFls 
The focus group discussion looked at constraining factors in terms of constraints in 
achieving the scale of outreach. Broader literature on the experience of microfinance in 
Zambia discusses these constraints in terms of their general impact on sustainability. 
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These factors are not discussed in any order of priority because for the most part, 
institutions are affected at different levels. 
4.4.1 Inadequate Funding. 
According to the results of the focus group discussion, some MFis cannot get adequate 
capital needed in order to scale up their operations. Considerable amounts of money arc 
needed for on-lending and institutional development. Inadequate funding cripples scaling 
up and ultimately sustainability . That is why some institutions either fold up or maintain 
a small clicntele. 
4.4.2 Institutional Capacity 
Institutional development is the process by which the capacity to be self-sustainable is 
introduced or strengthened in an institution or organization (Edgcomb and Cawley 1993). 
Most MFls have inadequate institutional capacity in terms of experienced staff and board 
members. J\s earlier pointed out, microfinance institutions are relatively young and still 
need to develop their capacity to deliver their services in an efficient manner. Mfls 
combine both for profit and social motives and need staff, managers and boards that are 
appropriately trained to manage MFis. This means that a balance in skills needs to be 
created. Mbulo (2000) points out that most managers and staff come with considerable 
experience from NGOs specialised in charitable programmes, while most boards of 
directors either have experience in non-profit or for-profit organisations. Therefore, there 
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is a great need for exposure, training and reorienting of staff and MFI boards to equip 
them for managing MFis efficiently and effectively. It also takes time for staff to reach 
productivity because of the need for training and re-orientation. So some considerable 
investments need to be made to build capacity in the organisation to deliver credit and 
scale up. 
This view 1s supported by the results of the focus group discussion that there is 
inadequate qualified staff to manage the institutions. This is sometimes worsened by the 
problem of high staff turn over which has affected some institutions, due to low 
remuneration and inadequate incenti ves especially among field staff. 
Another capacity needing to be developed is that of Management Information Systems 
(MIS). Most Mfls do not have well-developed MIS. As a result data is not captured 
accurately and on time. This means that reports and in formation required for decision 
making is not produced in good time. This is also supported by Mbulo (2000) who points 
out that there is still a need for exposure to MIS being used by well-established Mfls. 
If MFls are to deli ver credit in a sustainable way they have to invest 111 the above 
mentioned aspects of institutional development. 
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4.4.3 Poor Infrastructure 
This refers to a whole range of infrastructure required by Mfls and their clients i.e., 
roads, various types of communication, post offices, banks. High operational costs are 
incurred due to poor and inadequate infrastructure especially in rural locations. This is 
especially a constraint to those organisations trying to reach a rural clientele, as they have 
to invest highly in overcoming problems posed by poor infrastructure. In fact, most 
institutions tend to operate in the provincial towns to avoid incurring higher costs of 
operation. This problem was pointed out in the focus group discussion 
4.4.4 A Scattered Rural Population 
Zambia is a large country with a relatively low population density especially in the rural 
areas. Most MF ls are therefore di scouraged to go into rural areas because of the high cost 
of operation. This is a problem because most of the poor live in rural areas and require 
credit for agriculture and related economic activities. In his review of literature on credit 
interventions in rural areas, Banda (1993) pointed out that agricultural credit tends to 
marginalise the small-scale producers and that there is a need to uplift the subsistence 
producer with emphasis on the poorer, the weaker and those who are remote. This 
problem will continue to persist until development of rural infrastructure is made a 
priority by the government. 
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4.4.5 High Dropout Rates 
Dropouts are clients who leave the programme for various reasons. One of the reasons 
has to do with default. Defaulting clients cease to be active after three months and 
inevitably drop oul. Another cause of dropouts is the group lending methodology, which 
is tai lor made to suit MFis with inadequate consideration to client needs. Making an 
observation on this, Likulunga and Simonda (200 I) point out that "it would appear that 
for a number of institutions, there is no adequate research and ground work done in order 
to design products and services actually demanded by clients". (Likulunga and Simone.la 
200 I :8). An example given is that of weekly repayments instituted by Mfls that are not 
suited for manufacturing businesses which need more than a week to get returns. Some 
clients therefore drop out even before getting the loan while other potential clients are 
kept out altogether. The extent of drop out rate is illustrated in Appendix I Table. 3 
showing the outreach of major Mrls in Zambia. For most Mfls, th1;; number of clients 
since the Mfl started compared to the number of active clients now shows quite a 
significant drop. 
4.4.6 A Poor Credit Culture 
Poor credit culture basically refers to the attitudes both people and institutions have 
developed towards credit overtime. This is also referred to as a 'poor credit discipline.' It 
is a culture of poor loan repayment, which seems to affect quite a good number of 
institutions. lt dates back to the post independence era and is referred to in the above 
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discussion on the history of microcredit during which the govenm1cnt created 
microfinance institutions. "The general perception was that this was a way of 
compensating the people for having supported the independence struggle and therefore 
these loans were not to be paid back" . (Likulunga and Simonda 200 l :4). This problem is 
also alluded to in the focus group discussion. 
A schedule of repayment rates is attached for selected institutions for the year 2000 as 
appendix 1 Table 4. This includes various institution types including those providing 
consumption loans. 
Likulunga and Simonda (200 l) further point out that according to MFls best practice, the 
recovery rate of a given MFI should at least be 95% for it to be sustainable. According to 
these authors. the repayment rates obtaining in other countries are higher than this, 
although statistics to substantiate these claims arc scanty. For example, the authors point 
out that the average rate for MFis in Ethiopia is 98% according to a review conducted in 
March 2000. (Likulunga and Simonda 200 l :6). 
4.4.7 Macroeconomic Environment 
This section considers the impact of the macro economic environment on the 
sustainability of microfinance institutions. The ability of Zambian small and micro 
entreprenuers to benefit from microfinance depends on favourable trade policies. The 
current trade policy allows for umestricted importation of goods into the country without 
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consideration o f the impact on loca l manufacturing. Manufacturing is especially a ffected 
due to high taxes on imported raw materi als and low taxes on imported goods. This 
exposes local industries to unfair competition. It has become expensive fo r loca l 
manufac turers to produce goods; while at the same time, imported goods have become 
cheaper. Thus, liberalisation has inevitably led to the closure of domestic industries. The 
current macro-economic environment is therefore hostile to the development of m icro 
enterprise especially for small industries that cannot compete with imports . 
The inflation rate is also quite high leading to low returns on any fo rm of investment. The 
macro economic ind icators pose a threat to sustainab ility of MFis . The inOation rate as at 
December 1999 stood at 20.6% and at 30% in the year 2000 and 19.6% in 200 I (See table 
5. 1 below). The exchange rate of the Kwacha against the major convertible currencies 
has always taken an upward swing. For example the exchange rate yearly average has 
steadily increased from K2,434 to l US$ in 1999, to KJ 14 7 in 2000 and K36 l 7 in 200 1 
(See table 5.1 below). 
In this case MFI returns on investment keep losing value and could lead to dc-
capitalisation unless the MFI increases interest rates charged on loans. The cl ients' return 
on investments are also reduced because although they are able to charge higher prices, 
the money progressive ly loses value. The high interest rates m ake it expensive and 
difficult for them to repay the loans. This is also confirmed by Mbulo (2000) who points 
out that : 
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"The high interest rates make borrowing ve1y expensive and in most cases, borrowers do 
not graduate but continue to borrow afier every loan indicating that they have not earned 
s11fficie111 retums to enable them graduate from microcredit to formal financial 
institutions".( Mbulo. 2000:7) 
Table 4.1 Zambia: Inflation, Exchange rates, Real GDP 1999-2001 
1999 2000 2001 
• 
Inflation % 20.6% 30.0% 19.6 
Ex. Rate to 1 US$ 2434 3147 36 19 
Real GDP% 2.0 3.5 -
Source: SADC, Regional Economic Review, 2000 and Bank of Zambia, Statistics 
Fortnightly, 2002. 
4.4.8 Political intervention 
Political intervention is also said to have contributed to the poor credit discipline and 
even up to now this is prevalent especially during election time. This view is also 
presented from results of the focus group discussion and supported by Likulunga and 
Simonda (200 l ) who point out in their research that political intervention has included 
the following: some political leaders encourage loanees in their constituencies not to pay 
back as a way of buying votes; some politicians give directi ves to government supported 
institutions to give loans to people of their choice, regardless of whether they are 
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creditworthy or not; and still, some political leaders borrow from institutions and do not 
pay back. For example " it is public knowledge that about 90% of the agents who 
borrowed from the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) and have not pa id back are politi cians". 
(Likulunga and S imonda, 2001 : I 0). The poor credit culture is inevitably worsened by all 
the constraints discussed above. 
But in add ition to this negative intervention, another problem identified during the focus 
group discussion is the lack of ' political will '. In this case politicians lack the will to 
implement policy in general. So even if a lot of good policies are formulated they are not 
translated into action. This of course is of no benefit to the ind ustry. 
4.4.9 The Regulatory/legal Framework 
MFis in 7.arnbi a are required by law to register either under the Societies Act or under the 
Companies Act. They are required to also register with the Bank of Zambia under the 
Banking and fi nancial Services Act. The existing regulatory framework on MFls is 
inadequate and inappropriate fo r MFis (Ibid .). The current regulatory framework offers 
limited options for MFls in that it basically caters for commercial banks with a very high 
start up capital requirement fo r example. MFls are also unable to take savings deposits 
from the public and this limits the expansion especially of those with little access to 
donor funding. As a result AMlZ in conjuncti on with the Bank o f Zambia has been 
working out a legal framework appropriate fo r MFis. This new framework has however 
yet to be implemented. 
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The legal process prosecuting defaulters is also deemed unfavourable to MFls because it 
is long and time consuming. According to Likulunga and Simonda (200 I), because or 
this, many defaulting clients are not motivated to pay back. In addition, defaulting under 
such circumstances works to the advantage of the client because they buy time to clear 
their loans and the amount outstanding will be worth much less because of inflation. 
Currently, legal redress is also expensive for MFls in that what may be eventually 
recovered is much less than the amount spent on the legal process itself. Mfls have been 
pressing for the establishment o f a small claims court, which can allow for quicker 
disposal of default cases. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Zambian microfinance industry has been termed as young and develop ing. In its 
relatively short history, it has faced a number of constraints that pose a tlueat to the 
industry. The constraints identified are real and alluded to in various literature and in the 
focus group discussion. Due to the ever-growing size of the informal sector, the number 
of microfinance institutions has however continued to grow in spite of the constraints. 
The survival or sustainability of the Mf-ls will nevertheless, depend a great deal on their 
internal capacity to mobilise funds for scaling up, generate enough revenue to cover their 
operating costs. as well as adapt their systems to suit the ir clients. The constraints in the 
external environment require various stakeholders in the industry to work through. Since 
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microfinance plays an important ro le in poverty reduction and employment creati on, 
there are already efforts within the industry to bring together various stakeholders. T his is 
evidenced by the existence of the Association for Microfinance Institutions of Zambia 
(AMIZ) and the Micro Bankers Trust (MBT) whose objectives center around the building 
capacity of MFis and lobbying for a more conducive environment for microfinancc. 
There is also a lot of research in Microfinance whose results are be ing ut ili sed evidenced 
by the number o r workshops to discuss the find ings and the way fo rward. The constra ints 
are therefore real. but not totally insurmountable especiall y with a lo t of co ll aborati on 
between MFis and o ther stakeholders in the area of poverty reduction. 
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CHAPTERS 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS-CREDIT MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
(CMS) 
5.0. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed how microfinance institutions have emerged and grown 
in Zambia. It set out the various constraints experienced by the industry as a whole and 
how these have affected the sustainability of the Mfls in general. Given thi s context, this 
chapter zeroes in on Credit Management Services Limited (CMS) and seeks to analyse its 
operational efficiency and sustainability. The chapter begins by presenting a brief 
background of the institution and discusses the findings of the field survey in terms of 
client and target group characteristic. Then the findings on the lending methodology, 
outreach and interest rates are presented. The question of how staffing policies, the 
training of credit officers and management information systems can enhance the capacity 
of the organisation to deliver credit and increase its outreach is discussed. In one of the 
key sections of this chapter, the operational efficiency, operational and financial 
sustainability ratios of the organisation are presented and analysed. The analysis is based 
on information based on the audited financial reports obtained from Credit management 
Services for the years 1999, 2000 and 200 l (Appendix 4 shows the calculations of 
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effi ciency and susta inability ratios). The data is interpreted given the question whether 
Credit Management Services Ltd. is sustainable and finally some conclusions are drawn. 
5.1 BACKGROUND OF CREDIT MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
Credit Management Services started in 1992 as a limited company. Initially it managed 
credit funds on behalf of the European Union for a large-scale agricultural crop 
marketing loan fund. It became a full-fledged Mfl in 1997 when it started lending on its 
own account. In effect, the institution has been operational for about 5 years. It started off 
by borrowing loan funds from The Micro Bankers' Trust (MBT) at subsidized rates of 
interest. The company has also been funded by USAID, and FAO. 
The company is registered with the Bank of Zambia as a non-deposit taking financial 
Institution under the Banking and financial Services Act of 1994. 
5.1.1 Mission and Objectives 
The mission of the institution is " to improve the access by the poor to financial services 
and credit to enable them improve their standard of li ving". (CMS Progress Report 2000) 
Their objectives include: 
To promote savings and credit as a tool of social and economic change. 
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To educate clients in enterprise development and sustainable economic growth and 
generation of new employment acti vities. 
To assist clients deve lop self-conGdence, self-discipline, concern for others and also 
create soc ial pressure. 
To create a full y commercial and sustainable company. 
5.1.2 Geographical Co\leragc 
CMS covers fi ve out the l 0 provmces in Zambia namely: Eastern, Southern, Lusaka, 
Central and Copperbelt provinces. Thus it has both urban and rural coverage although it 
has a significantly higher proportion of clients in the rural areas. The spread o f clients is 
90% rural and 10% urhan. This in itself is of great s ignificance for sustainability because 
Zambia is a large country w ith poorly developed infrastructure. 
5.1.3 Staffing of CMS 
The company has a decentralised structure with a skeleton sta ff at the Head O ffi ce. The 
Head office staff are as follows: Director, General Manager, Chie f Accountant, a 
computer advisor and a driver. Regional sta ff are as follows: 
Three (3) Regional Managers 
One ( l ) Regional Accountant 
67 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Twenty five (25) Credit O ffi cers 
Tlu-ee (3) Regional Receptionists/Cashiers 
Three (3) Credit Co-odinators 
Six (6) computer Operators 
Two (2) Drivers 
Three (3) Cleaners 
5. 1.4 Lending Methodology 
CMS uses the solidarity group lending methodology. Clients come together in groups of 
20-25 and guarantee each other's loans. They pay 25% o f the loan amount before the loan 
is granted as guarantee in case of default by any member of the group. The guaranteed 
amount is kept by the organisation until all group members have paid back their loans. 
Legally. the organi sation is not permitted to use this money us a source of capital for 0 11-
lending. The loan guarantee money is paid back to clients upon full repayment of their 
loans. 
All Clients have to undergo orientation and training in the credit methodology for about 
five weeks before the loans are disbursed. The training is conducted by credit offi cers and 
evaluated by regional managers. The training is to ensure that the methodology is 
understood and the groups are well consolidated before any moneys are disbursed . 
68 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
5.1.5 Credit Officer Training 
In house training is conducted fo r credit officers. Some of the topics covered include: 
C lient selection, disbursement and monitoring, record keeping, loan methodology, 
prevention of default. risk management, time management and work planning. After this 
classroom training, they are attached to branches for a four-month period of orientation 
before they are allowed to handle clients. 
5.1.6 Management Information Systems (MIS) 
The company uses speci fically designed MIS, which combines loan tracking and 
accounting. This is suited MF! needs because in formation is produced promptly for 
decision making at any give time. CMS is one of the few MFls in the country with a 
developed MIS. 
5.2. DATA PRESENTATION 
5.2.1 Services Offered 
CMS offers cred it, training and savmgs services as shown in table 5.1 below. The 
company plans to introduce life and medical insurance. This is because most clients tend 
to fall back on the ir working capital in case of illness or death in their families. The 
organisation is plaru1ing to introduce li fe insurance in case of death of a client before the 
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loan is full y repaid. /\ considerable amount of default is attributed to use of work ing 
capital on urgent fa mily problems. lt is expected that introduction of life and health 
insurance will improve loan repayment. The clients will contribute to the insurance 
scheme and be paid upon the death or sickness of a member or their immediate fa mi ly. 
Table 5.1 Services Offered /Planned 
Credit Forced Training Life Medical 
Savings lnsurance lnsurance 
Services x x x 
Offered 
Planned x x 
Services 
5.2.2 Target Group Characteristics 
The target group of CMS is small business operators, small-scale manufacturers, and 
small livestock traders. The company targets both men and women who are credit 
worthy. The percentage o f clients that are female is estimated to be 66% whi le the 
percentage of male clients is 44%. These groups of people wo uld be those who have li tt le 
or no access to financial services from commercial banks. According to the company, 
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these are middle and lower income groups in urban centers, peri-urban and rural areas. 
The company covers a range of literacy levels, i.e. literate, semi-literate and illiterate. 
Currently 90% of its clientele is in the rural while l 0% is in the peri-urban areas. The 
target group of the organisation is a broad range of the poor and not necessari ly the 
poorest. 
5.2.3 Economic Activities of Clients 
Economic act ivities of clients are trading, manufacturing (bricks, furniture, clothing), 
crop marketing and agriculture. The majori ty of the clients are in small business 
especially trading. Most agricultural loans are now given for non-seasonal agricultural 
activities such as vegetable growing and poultry. The company is now deliberately 
reducing the number of agricultural loans because of the risk associated with seasonal 
farming. In the past years a number o f clients hnve fail ed to pay back loans Jue to poor 
harvest resulting from drought conditions. 
Table 5.2 Economic Activities of Clients (%) 
Trading Manufactur Service Agriculture Other Total 
ing 
70 12 10 5 3 100% 
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5.2.4 Client Outreach 
Accord ing to data obtained from AMIZ, the number of active clients for the year 2000 
was 12.100. The total number of clients who have received loans since the program 
started arc 35.600 (See Appendix I. Table 3). CMS records show that the drop out rates 
as fo llows: Drop out rate 1999=3%, 2000=3%, 200 l =5%. The dropouts are those who 
leave the programme for various reasons including default, and conditions imposed by 
the group lending methodology. Such conditions include frequent weekly repayment of 
loans and guarantee condi tions. According to this insti tution, the main hindrance to 
increased client outreach is the default rate. This is alluded to in the focus group 
di scussion as a high drop out rate due to default. When clients default, they automatically 
drop out of the programme. 
5.2.5 Interest Uate and other charges 
The organisation currently charges average compounded interest rates of l 00% per 
annum. The rate was 120% in 1999, l 00% for 2000 and 2001. Since the average loan 
period is about four to nine months the organisation normally calculates interest on a 
monthly basis. To provide an incentive to good clients, the interest rate is reduced for 
consecutive loans. The average interest rates per month are as follows: first cycle I 0%; 
second cycle 8%; third and subsequent loans 7.5% per month. Credit Management 
Services calculates the interest rate to cover operational costs as well as inflation. 
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In addition. an administrative fee equivalent of US$ l .40 per client is charged . This fee is 
meant to cover the cost of administering the loan to the client. A training fee of 5% of the 
loan amount is charged per client to cover training related expenses. 
Table 5.3 Annual Interest rntes and other charges 
1999 2000 200 1 
Interest 120% 100% 100% 
Training 5% 5% 5% 
Fees 
Admin Fees US$ i .40 US$ 1.40 US$1.40 
A veragc loan sizes are as fo llows; 
I s i loan US$ 70 
211J loan US$ 140 
3 rd loan US$ 2 10 
maximum US$ 700 
5.2.6 Efficiency Ratios 
As reflected in the table below, the operating cost ratio has been decreasing in the past 
three years. This ra tio stood at 11 8% in 1999, 97% in 2000 and 89% in 200 I. The ratio of 
operating costs to average portfo lio outstanding is however above the average cost ratio 
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for success ful Mfls that is estimated to vary between 13-2 l % (Christen et al, 1995 
quoted in Ledgerwood, 1999). However the consistent decrease in the ratio is a positive 
indicator of increasing efficiency. The high ratio is attributed to the cost of hiring fi eld 
staff due to expansion of the operations of the organization. The table also indicates that 
the number of clients per Credit Officer increased in the period 1999 to 2000, but 
remained stable in 2001. An observation is also made that successful Mfls tend to have 
operating cost ratios of between 13 and 2 1 percent of their average Joan portfolios and 
between 5 and 16 percent of their average total assets. However consideration is al so 
given to the fact that this institution has been in existence for a comparatively shorter 
time than the sustainable insti tutions. 
Successful MFis have salaries and benefits running between 4 percent and 16 percent of 
average portfolio outstanding (Christen ET al, 1995 quoted in Ledgerwood, 1999). Credit 
management with levels of 65%, 53% and 41 % in three consecutive years would fall far 
outside the 'successful ' range. On the other hand, the trend in the three years indicates 
that there is an improvement in this e fficiency ratio. In the absence of critical 
comparisons like credit methodology, and population density (Christen ct al , 1995 quoted 
in Ledgerwood, 1999), however it would be premature to conclude that it is inefficient. 
This high percentage (as in the above discussion of the operational cost ratios) is 
attributed to sala1y costs due to expansion. On the whole there is a positive trend in CMS 
because the decrease in ratios is an indication of cost recovery as the organization 
expands. 
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Table 5.4 Efficiency Ratios 
Efficiency Ratio 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ratio 
Operating Costs Operating costs/ 98% 118% 97% 89% 
as % of Average Average 
portfolio portfolio 
outstanding outstanding 
• 
Salaries as % of Salaries/ Average 44% 65% 53% 41% 
Average portfolio 
Portfol io outstanding 
Outstanding 
Cost Per Unit of Operating costs/ 
- 58% 87% 87% 
Currency Lent Total amount 
disbursed 
Cost Per Loan Operating costs/ - 183,000 171 ,000 379,500 
Made(Kwacha) Total number of 
loans made 
Number of Average No. - 103 154 154 
active borrowers active 
per Credit borrowers/ Avera 
Officer (CO) ge no . COs 
Source: Adapted from Appendix 4. 
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5.2.7 Operntional and Financial Sustainability 
The data indicates that the institution is neither operationally nor financiall y self-
sufficient. According to the calculations l made based on audited financial statements for 
the years 1999. 2000 and 200 I, the ratio for operational and financial sustainability has 
been going down by margins indicated in the above table. This trend can be explained by 
the increase in the cost of operation which (as indicated is Appendix 4) is going up. 
Income for the organisation has been increasing while the costs of operating have also 
been increasing (see Appendix 4) . The operational costs have however increased at a 
faster pace. As explained above, thi s is due to the expansion in the operations of the 
organisation. This scenario is also alluded to in Chapter 2 with regard to concerns raised 
at the Africa Region Microcredit Summit (ARMS) by the practicing MFls. The concern 
is that an increase in the volume of loans requires expans ion into new areas thereby 
increasing costs for the institution . The cha llenge faced is how to maintain financial 
viabi lity while expanding outreach to the poor. The summit observed that at a practical 
level this is possible, but very difficult, to the extent that there are going to be very few of 
such sustainable financial institutions working w ith the poor (Final Report of the Africa 
Region Microcredit Summit. May 200 I) . 
Prior to 1999 the company only paid management fees as opposed to salaries. In 1999, 
the institution put in place a staff structure with a salary package of more than double of 
the management fees (See Appendix 4). The wage bill has been increasing in consecutive 
years. Further calculations in fact show that the percentage increase in the salary bill has 
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been reducing in consecutive years as follows: 158 % in 1999, 67% in 2000 and 37% in 
200 l .This indicates that the situation is in fact stabilising. This also explains why the 
number of active borrowers per Credit Officer has increased by 50% from 1999 to 2000, 
but remained the same in 200 1. This shows that the increase in cl ients has not been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in Credit Officers. Consequently, the 
organisation has been ab le to increase the number of clients without necessarily 
increasing staff. According to this Company, because of the solidarity group 
methodology and peer pressure, the individual members of the group <lo most of the 
monitoring, thereby reducing the load for the Credit OHicers. 
Operations for the organisation are decentralised. This means that most staff are located 
where the clients are, leaving a skeleton at the headquarters. This reduces the cost of 
travel and allows for close monitoring of clients. One of the problems of breaking even is 
associated with an expensive centrali sed system as pointed out by Chao-13eruff ( 1999) 
and discussed in chapter 2. Other reasons given for high transaction costs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are poor infrastructure, a dispersed population and high wages as compared to the 
Asian context (Chao-Beroff 1999 online). The rest of the costs, i.e. , the cost per unit of 
cmTency lent and cost per loan made have also increased in the period under review. 
These basically increase with increasing operational costs as in this case. 
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Table 5.5 Operational and Financial Self-sufficiency(%) 
Year Operational Financial 
Self- Self-
sufficiency sufficiency 
1998 110 105 
1999 73 61 
2000 77 70 
2001 57 54 
Source: Adapted from Appendix 4. 
5.3 ls CMS Ltd. Moving Towards Sustainability? 
On the outset. the institution is neither operationally nor financially sustainable as tabled 
above. But because of the fact that the organisation has only been in the field for a 
relatively short period, one may look at the trend and practices in the organisation and 
speak of whether the institution is showing positive trends and make deductions from 
there. This question needs to be answered in relation to direct factors determining 
sustainability, i.e., level of outreach, interest rates and other charges, as well as the 
efficiency of operations. The indirect factors are discussed in chapter 5 and these apply to 
78 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
the industry as a whole. But of special relevance to this organisation is the fact that 90% 
of its operations are in the rural areas, where infrastructure is relati vely poor and 
travelling distances longer. 
5.3.1 Outreach 
First of all, its outreach in 2000 was the highest among the Zambian MF!s fo r which data 
is provided. (See Appendix 1 Table 3). According to CMS, there has since been a 
decrease from this number to 6,000 because of non-repayment of agricultural loans 
occasioned by a drought period. The company has now stopped giving agricultural loans 
for seasonal crops. This company now foc uses more on the scale of outreach rather than 
depth of outreach. This is demonstrated by its shift to a wide range of clients who are 
mostly traders and small manufacturers and can be descri bed as ' mixed'. CMS has 
focussed more on cl ients with year round activities as opposed to surviva li st and seasonal 
economic activities. This kind of outreach is comparable to that discussed in chapter two 
under the subheading ' the sustainability camp'. Organisations that move towards 
financial sustainability faster arc those target ing a mixed range of clients rather than the 
poorest. The organisation has put in place some measures to retain its clients and impro ve 
the repayment rate. Por example it does not charge training fees for subsequent loans. 
The interest rate is also reduced for clients who repay loans on time. The current rate of 
repayment is indicated at 74% per ammm although the planned rate is 92%. The 
organisation has further plans for the expansion of its client base and improved 
repayment rates as fo llows: 
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3 I st March 200 l 6000 clients and 92% on time repayments 
3 1st march 2002 9,000 clients and 93% on time repayments 
3 1st March 2003 12,000 clients and 94% on time repayments 
Source: Credit Management Progress Report 2000 
5.3.2 .Interest rate and Other C harges 
The organisation makes deliberate attempts to recover its costs by charging economic 
interest rates. C MS al so charges its clients for any training done as well as administrati ve 
charges. Although the figures seem high, consideration is given to the fact that the 
inflation rate is relatively high and the currency devalues at a relatively fast pace. 
The interest rate of CMS is closer to that of Corposol and A DOPl: M of 7 1 % and 72% 
respectively, considering that Zambia has a higher rate of inflation . (See Appendix 1. 
Table 2 showing interest rates, inflation and return on assets). Corposal has the second 
highest inflation rate of the eleven institutions studied which at 19% per annum is 
relatively close to that of Zambia at an average of 23% per annum (See Table 4 .1 in 
Chapter 4). K-rep with a high rate o f inflation of 47% charged only 38% and made the 
lowest return on investments (See Appendix l. Table 2). Corposol makes the second 
highest return on investment. There is therefore a high correlation between the interest 
charged and return on investment. So far CMS seems to be go ing in the right direction 
with regard to charging economic rates of interest. 
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5.4. CONCLUSION 
Although CMS is not yet operationally or financially sustainable, evidence shows that the 
trend in its ef(i ciency rates are getting progressively better. The operational costs are high 
initially. This is because the institution has had to put in place a comprehensive staff 
structure and expand into new areas in order to allow for future growth in its client base. 
In the first few years, the organisation has been investing in institutional development, 
which as indicated in literature, is a pre-requisite for the sustainability of any MFI. This 
in fact is typ ical of the formative years even of the most sustainable institutions like the 
Grameen Bank. Shahidur, Khander, Khalily and Khan ( 1995) in speaking of the 
sustainability and subsidies with regard to the Grameen Bank point out that, despite the 
fact that group pressure promotes proper loan use and high loan recovery, it is doubtful 
that the Grameen Bank could have generated sufficient revenue in the early years o f its 
operation to support these costs. In the case of Credit Management Services however, 
findings indicate that the costs of running the institution have already started to stabilise, 
thereby indicating cost efficiency. 
Credit Management Services from the onset has included financial sustainability as one 
of its objectives and is deliberately working towards achieving this. Although the mission 
of the organisation is to make financial services available to the poor, it has a selection 
process that over the years ensures that only those operating viable and relatively ri sk free 
businesses arc recruited. In addition it ensures that its clients are deve loped to the extent 
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that they are able to manage their businesses. There are also indications that the 
organisation has set in motion mechanisms to recover costs and reduce dropouts thereby 
increasing its client outreach. Another good indicator for sustainability is that there is no 
signifi cant increase in its operation costs over the past three years although the number of 
cl ients has been increasing. The relatively higher cost ratios in my view are not an 
indicator of ineffi ciency in this case, given the number of years in operation as we ll as the 
organisation· s rural orientation. 
CMS gets subsidized loan capital for on-lending as oppesed to do nated equity as in the 
case of many other institutions locally and internationally. The interest rates arc set w ith a 
view of recovering costs as well as cover the rate of inflati on. As discussed above, CMS 
Ltd. also happens to have similar practices to the financially viable institutions referred to 
in Chapter 2 except that it is relatively young as a microfinance institution. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUS ION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis aimed at analysing the sustainability of Credit Management Services limited 
(CMS) within the context of the Zambian microfinance industry. The research discussed 
the sustainability debate, the emergence o f MP'ls in Zambia and the constraints faced by 
• 
the Zambian microfinance industry as a whole. The research then discussed and analysed 
the efficiency and sustainability of CMS as a case study of the Zambian industry. This 
concluding chapter of the thesis will summarise and discuss salient findings of thi s 
research in both the literature survey and the empirical findings. It will then di scuss how 
the fi ndings of this research have relevance fo r the microfinance industry in Zambia. 
Recommendations fo r further research and for stakeholders are also made. 
6.lSummary and Conclusions 
Findings of this research show that there are few financiall y sustainable microfinance 
institutions in the world and that even the best of these have reached financial 
sustainability a fter substantial subsidisation. It is also evident that most microfinance 
programmes have failed not because they have been subs idized, but because they have 
been ineffic ient and their costs of operation have been too high resulting in their closing 
down due to insolvency. MFls therefore need to operate more efficiently and recover 
costs in order to be sustainable. The facts on the ground however point to the fact that for 
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some programmes, increasing outreach will entail increasing costs thereby compromising 
sustainability. This is a paradox also discussed at the Africa Region Microcredit summit 
and alluded to in other literature. 
findings also indicate that some microfinance programmes have failed because lending 
methodologies have been inappropriate. Coupled with this is the fact that some 
programmes have operated in unsuitable geographical locations because of donor and 
government pressure to extend services to the poorest. This partly suggests why it has 
taken longer for some institutions to be sustainable than others. A lot of experimentation 
has therefore had to take place for institutions to arrive at methodologies and systems 
appropriate for their clients. This requires time, flexibility and financial investment in 
capacity building. Hence MFls must be given an opportunity to grow into stable 
institutions because only then can they scale up and become sustainable. 
Concluding from literature on experience around the world, the delivery of credit to a 
broad spectrum of poor clients is more sustainable than that directed at the poorest. This 
is because serving poor clients implies higher costs and risks for lenders. Small loans arc 
more expensive to administer and yield relatively lower returns on investment for the 
MFis. In Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes Zambia, most clients in this group are 
found in rural locations where the costs of operating are relatively high. As a result, some 
institutions have preferred to serve a mixed range of clients rather than target the poorest. 
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Lessons also point to the fact that microfinance is not always the most appropriate 
intervention in alleviating poverty. Where it is not appropriate or susta inable, 
stakeholders need to invest in other interventions that will provide an enabling 
environment for micro enterprise to nourish. Notably investments in both social and 
physical infrastructure need to be made. This will create an enabling environment for 
rural enterprise to survive and consequently contribute to sustainability of MFls. 
Credit delivery mechanisms seem to have been evolving because of unsatisfactory results 
in terms of impact and sustainability of institutions. /\nd so, there has been a continued 
bid to increase impact by way of creating more appropriate institutions for credit 
delivery. The trend has been from subsidised bank loans, to subsidised socially oriented 
institutions, then to creation of financially viable institutions. As a result of this another 
conclusion that can be drawn is that microiinance as a poverty intervention strategy has 
shifting paradigms just as any other development intervention. 
Findings show that Credit Management Services is not yet operationally or financially 
sustainable, but analysis of the trends of efficiency shows that this is improving by the 
year. If this trend can be maintained, the institution is on its way to financial viability. 
The high operational costs are attributed to high investment in capacity building to enable 
the institution to expand into new areas and allow for growth in its client base. This in 
itself is a pre-requisite for the sustainability of any MF!. Findings indicate that the costs 
of running the institution have already started to stabilise, thereby indicating some 
measure of cost recovery. 
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CMS operating 111 the Zambian context, is beginning to embrace best practice like 
charging economic rates of interest and increasing client outreach. Credit Management 
Services has a high client outreach compared to other institutions in Zambia. In addition 
to this. it has also streamlined its selection process for clients as well as the kind of 
activities to support. This is an indicator that the organisation is working at maintaining 
and expanding its client base. Findings also indicate that CMS, with regard to pricing 
policies has practices similar to financially viable institutions in other regions of the 
world. The fact that the other organisations have received substantial subsidies while 
CMS uses borrowed capital for on lending is a good indicator that the possibility of 
eventually becoming financially viable exists. 
Credit Management Services has 90% of its clients in rural areas meaning that the cost of 
operat ing is relatively high compared to its urban counterparts. The implication of this is 
that it might delay the financial viability of the institution. C MS has however 
decentralised its operations in a bid to be near its clients and cut operational costs. These 
are efforts that contribute to cost efficiency and increasing revenue. 
The organisation also displays a greater measure of transparency as compared to the other 
Zambian institutions. This makes it possible for the organisation to get input into its 
operations and make necessary adjustments. 
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CMS though not financially sustainable can serve as a model for microfinancc 'best 
practices' for the rest of the Zambian M Fls. 
6.2 Relevance of Findings for the Zambian Microfinance Industry 
Findings of this research indicate that building a sustainable microfinance industry in 
Zambia will not be easy. first of all , the Zambian microfinance industry is yo ung and 
developing. Secondly, in its relatively short history, a number of constraints ranging from 
internal ones like institutional capacity and inadequate funding, to those in the external 
environment like macroeconomic policies and political intervention have been identified. 
These constraints need to be addressed in order to enhance sustainability of the industry. 
A number of factors have been identified that can enhance sustainability or work against 
it. In the light of the findings of this research on both the international scene and from 
Cred it Management Services a number of lessons and applications arc therefore drawn 
fo r the Zambian mierofinanee industry. 
Most Zambian tvlFls are donor funded and sti ll have a lot of social considerations to 
make. The result is that they do not charge economic rates of interest because they are 
deemed exorbitant for poor clients. However for a country like Zambia w ith a currency 
that loses value at a fast rate, it is important that interest rates be set high enough to 
recover operational costs as well as the inflation. As shown in the broader literature and 
CMS in particular. onl y those institutions that set their interest rates high enough are able 
to move towards efficiency and ultimately, sustainability. 
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One of the biggest hindrances to client outreach by Zambian MFls is the lack of funding 
for operations and expansion. The main problem is that most MFis have been depending 
on donor funding for their operations and lack the capacity to source other funding. One 
way of resolving this is to change thei r legal status, for example, to register as limited 
companies. This will allow for sourcing of funds other than subsidies. This has in fact 
been done by CMS. One of the biggest assets of CMS is that it has been able to borrow 
funds for on lending from various donors. The survival of Zambian MFis will therefore 
depend a great deal on the ir internal capacity to mobilise funds for scaling up and 
generate enough revenue to cover their operating costs. Findings of the literature 
reviewed on the Zambian MFis indicate that some initial investment in building the 
capacity of the MFls is required for instance in terms of a stable staff structure, 
management information systems and a stable and growing client base. CMS has been 
able to invest in this because of its capacity to source funding other than grants. 
MF Is need to avoid remote rural locations where micro finance is not feasible, due to low 
density of population, poor state of roads and other infrastructure. In some cases there 
might even be a demand for microfinance services, but this demand has to be adequate to 
cover the operational costs in order for microfinance to be feasible. Remote rural 
locations require more travel time and consequentl y higher costs of operating. Some 
Zambian MFis operate in relatively remote locations and stakeho lders need to reconsider 
whether microfinance is the best intervention. 
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Caution also needs to be exercised with regard to the type of economic activities to 
support. CMS lost almost half its client base because of their inability to pay back 
agricultural loans due to drought. Credit Management Services has had to stop giving 
agricultural loans because of the risks involved. Mono crop economic activities pose 
higher risks than that of mixed non-seasonal activities. MFis need to avoid this because 
the chances o f default are much higher. This can perpetuate a culture of non-repayment 
as clients eventually fail to take loans seriously. 
High wages contribute to high operational costs. For example in the case of CMS, 
findings show that thi s constitutes half of the operational costs. This has been the most 
expensive operational cost. Mfls need to work more at utili sing local local human 
resource for monitoring in order to cut down on thi s cost thereby increasing their 
operational efficiency. Linked to this is the need to cut down on expensive centralized 
staff structures. The implication of thi s is that Zambian MFis do need to considl:r 
reducing on top-heavy structures and hire Jess expensive local staff as in the case of the 
Asian MFls. Simple management structures and credit methodologies need to be 
developed in order to make it possible for the institutions to be financially viable without 
imposing costs that are too high on clients. 
One of the problems of maintaining and attracting clients is the inappropriate application 
of the lending methodology. This is widely discussed in literature and seems to be a 
problem in general for Zambian institutions. The group lending methodology needs to be 
adapted according to local needs. Market research should ideally focus equally on both 
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client and Mfl needs. This is important because the MFls need to maintain their clients to 
be sustainable. Therefore a good balance needs to be struck between client needs and 
MF! needs in order for the MFls to be sustainable. 
Organisations also need a clear mission and objectives that deliberately include the need 
to create sustainable institutions. Most o f the organisations have set good social 
objectives but have not articulated the need to create financially sustainable 
organisations. Setting the sustainability objective is important because it helps the 
organisations focus on working towards viability while serving the poor. This has been 
the case with CMS. 
CMS therefore provides some valuable lessons, which the other Zambian Mfls can learn 
from. The constraints faced by Zambian MFis are therefore real but not totally 
insurmountable because there are a lot of examples of what works and dues not work for 
creating sustainable MFls. 
6.3 RECOMMEND A TIO NS 
6.3.1 For Further Research 
I. A serious concern pointed out in the literature is that there is inadequate empirical 
data on client poverty profiles and occupations served by various institutions. 
Researchers therefore need to look into a comparative study of the poverty levels 
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and other economic profiles or clients being serviced by institutions across 
Zambia. This will equip stakeholders and researchers with readily available 
information for making informed deci sion with regard to the type or investment to 
make in an organisation. This being an international concern will a lso make such 
research more attracti ve for funding. 
2. There is a need to do sustai nabi lity analysis of a representative number of 
microfinancc institutions in order to determine the extent to which the Zambian 
MFls are sustainable. This will give stakeholders more empirical data as to the 
sustainability of the Mfls. 
3. There is a need for MFis to provide complete and accurate information especiall y 
on financial performance. This is so that more can be known about sustainability 
of programmes serving the poor. The current level of transparency needs to be 
improved upon if results of research are to be complete and valid. 
6.3.2 For Stakeholders 
l . Stakeholders need to be conscious of the fact that microfinance as a poverty 
reduction instrument is not always the appropriate intervention. There are 
circumstances that would undermine the financial sustainabi lity of institutions and 
need to be avoided. Microfinance should ideally target poor entrepreneurs 
needing to build an asset base to operate enterpri ses and not the destitute. 
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2. Donors need to consider investing in and strengthening local institutions owned 
by local communities which have been there and have survived through time. 
This is because people will support and contribute more to what they own and 
already have a stake in. The best example is the utilization of the village bank 
model, which is being used in many parts of Africa. 
3. Zambian Institutions need to look into mobilisation of voluntary savings from the 
local communities. This will serve as a potential source of loan capital instead of 
depending on grants for on lending. This will also reduce risk for the MFis as the 
clients ' deposits are controlled by the institutions. The introduction of deposit 
taking will also reduce the dropout rates because there will be more bonding 
between the clients and the organisations. 
92 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
REFERENCES 
Allen T.,Thomas A. (2000). Poverty and Development into the 2 r' Centwy. Oxford 
University press. London. 
Banda M. (1993). Zambia Rural Financial Services. Unpublished research paper. 
Barton L., Edgecomb E. (August 1998). Social Intermediation and Micro.finance 
Programmes: A literature Review. The SEEP Network c/o Pact. 
http://www.mip.org/pdfs/mbp/social/pdf 11 /04/02. 
Bonti-Ankomah S .. Chamba L. (January 2000). The Structure and Constrains of Rural 
Aficrojinance in South A.fi"ica. NIEP Occassional Paper Series, No. 18. 
Chao-Beroff R. ( 1999) The Constraints and Challenges Associated with Developing 
Sustainable Microjlnance Systems in Disadvantaged Rural Areas in Africa. 
http ://www.u nc<lf.org/sum/ reports/ papers/ftp downloads/chao beroff study.doc. 
11109/01. 
Chidzero A. (1998). Mozambique Microjinance Study. University Press. UEM. Maputo. 
93 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
CGAP. Focus Note No.20. (May 200 I). Micro finance, Grants, and nun-financial 
Responses lo Poverty reduction: Where Does microcredit Fit? The World bank. 
Washington, D.C. 
Copestake J., Bhalotra S., Johnson S. (April 2001). Assessing the Impact o.f Microcredit: 
A Zambian Case. In Journal of Development Studies. Volume 37, No. 4. Frank Cass. 
London. 
Chua R., Llanto G. ( 1996). Assessing the Efficiency and Outreach of Microjinance 
Schemes. Poverty Oriented banking Working Paper No. 15. ILO. Geneva. 
Edgcomb E., Cawley J (eds). ( 1993). An Jnslilutional Guide for Enterprise Development 
Organisations. The Small Enterprise Education and Promotion network (SEEP). P J\CT. 
New York. 
Getu M. (1996). Micro ente1prise development and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. In 
Alexander p L l Iutchison R. , Schreuder D (eds). Africa Today: A multidisciplinary 
Snapshot of the Continent. Humanities Research Center Monograph Series No. 12. 
Australian National University. 
Gurgad M. , Pederson G., Yaron J. (1994). Outreach and sustainability of Six Rural 
Finance Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 248. The 
World Bank. Washington DC. 
94 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Institutional Alternatives for Microfinance. A Concept Paper. 
http ://www.mip.org/pdfs/mbp/topic 16pdf 11 /04/02 
Liato-Katundu B .. Nakalonga M. ( 1999). World Bank Action Research Champion Team 
Consultancy Report on Social and Economic Impact of lvficrojinance Institutions in 
Za111bia. Unpublished. 
Ledgerwood J. ( 1999). Micro finance II and book: An Institutional and Financial 
Perspective. Sustainable Banking with the Poor. The World bank. Washington, D.C. 
Loan Sizes. Lending Strategies and Pol'erty Concept paper. (March I 0 1997). 
http://\\W\Y.mip.org/pdfs/mbp/topic2.pdf 11/04/0 I. 
Mbanacele C . (ARMS 2000) Experiences with Microcredit : A Case Study o_f Zambia. A 
paper presented at the Africa Region Microcredit Summit. October 8-12, 2000. Harare, 
Zimbabwe. Unpublished Paper. 
Mbulo M. (2000). An Overview of Microflnance Institutions in Zambia. J\ paper 
presented at a workshop on Experiences of Microfinance Institutions In Zambia, held on 
19th September. 2000 at Chainama Hotel , Lusaka. Unpublished. 
95 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Micro Enterprise Innovation Project (MIP) USAID. (March 10 l 997). Loan Sizes, 
Lending Strategies and Poverty Concept paper. 
http://www.mip.org/pdfs/mbp/topic2. p<l r 11 /04/02. 
Microcredit Summit Campaign. (200 l ). Final Report. Africa Region Microcredit Summit 
Meeting of Councils. October 8-12, 2000, l Iarare, Zimbabwe. 
Microcredit Summit Campaign. (200 l ). Asia Pacific Region Aficrocredit Summit Meeting 
ofCouncils. February 1-5. New Delhi , India. 
Mosley P. (April 200 l) Microjinance and Poverty in Bolivia. In Journal of Development 
Studies. Volume 37, No. 4. Frank Cass. London. 
Mutalima I. (2000). An assessl/lent of the Rule and pe1fur111ance of Christian 
Microfinance /11stit11tions (CMF!s) in the tramfonnativn <~(communities: the case of 
CETZAM's rormation and Operations in Zambia between 1995 and 1999. Oxford Centre 
for Mission Studies. Unpublished. 
Morduch J. ( March 1997). The Grameen Bank: A financial Reckoning. 
w'l..vw.wws.princeton.edu/rpds/macarthur/downloads/gb5am1.pdf 11/04/02. 
Morduch J. (April 2000). The Microjinance Schism. In World Development. Vol.28. 
No.4. N uffield Press. London. 
96 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Likulunga M. Simonda E. (2001 ). Final Report on Zambia's Credit Culture: A Re-Look. 
Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia. Unpublished Study. 
Ravicz R. ( 1998). Searching for Sustainable Micro finance: A Review uf Five Indonesian 
Initiatives. Policy Research Working Paper 1818. The World Bank Development 
Research Group. Washington DC. 
Reinke J. (Februal)' 1998). How to Lend Like Mad and Make a Profit: A Microcredit 
Paradigm Versus the Start-Up Fund in South Africa. In the Journal of Development 
Studies. Vol.34 No.3 .. Frank Cass. London. 
Rhyne E. MicroBanking Bulletin. (July 1998). 7'lw Yin and Yang of Microjinance: 
Reaching the poor and sustainability. http://www.ids.ac.uk/cgap/download/yym.pdf 
211010 I. 
Schreiner M. (June 1999). Aspects of Outreach: A Framework for the Discussion of the 
Social benefits of Microfinance. 
http://www.micro linance.com/Engli sh/papers/ Aspects of outreach.pdf 12/04/02. 
Seibel H. D. , Parhusip U. (1999). Attaining Outreach with Sustainability: A Case Study of 
a Private Microjinance Institution in Indonesia. 
www. uni-koe ln.de/e'vv-fak/aef/PFDnew/s Bo2 workingPaper-l3ankShitaDaya.pdf 
12/04/02. 
97 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Shahidur R., Khander S., Khalily B. , Khan Z. (1995). Grameen Bank: Pe1formance and 
Sustainability. World bank Discussion paper No. 306. The World Bank. Washington 
DC. 
The Microcredit Summit. l 997). http://wvvw.microcreditsummit.org/bests itc.htm 
21111 10 I. 
The Microfinance Framework for Policy and practice: Financial Sustainability. 
http://w,.vw.gclrc .org/ icm/framework/frame3 .html. I 0/09/0 l . 
UNCDF. Client Exits (drop-outs) from Ugandan Microfinance Institutions. 
http://www.uncdf.org/sum/mcu/studies exits uganda.htm. 20/08/01 . 
United Nations Report. (2000). The Role of Micro Credit in Poverty alleviation. 
www.~rameen-in fo.org/mcredit/unreport 20/08/0 l. 
USAID Evaluation Highlights No. 49. (June 1995). Maximizing the outreach of 
Microenterprise finance. The Emerging Lessons of Successful programs. 
http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/pnabs52 J .pdf. 22/10101. 
98 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Weimer M., Chalmers G. (March 200 I) Microfinance Issues and Challenges m the 
Anglophone Caribbean. Inter-American Development Bank. 
http:/ /www.iadab.org/sds/doc/MlCCari bbean Wem1er.pdf. 10/04/02. 
Yaron J. (1992). Successful Rural Finance institutions. World Bank Discussion papers. 
No. I SO. The World Bank. Washington DC. 
99 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
APPENDIX 1. 
Table 1. Age and Type of Selected Institutions 
Name( country) Age Type of Institution Urban 
yrs /rural 
ACEP (Senegal) 8 NGO/credit union Both 
ADOPEM (DR) 12 NGO Both 
BancoSol (Bolivia) 7 Private Commercial Bank Urban 
BKD (Indonesia) 40+ Village-owned financial Institution Rural 
BRI Unit Desa System (Indonesia) 10 Division of Gov' t commercial Bank Both 
BRK (Niger) 3 NGO Rural 
CorpoSol (Colombia) 6 NGO/finance company Urban 
FINCA (Costa Rica) 10 NGO Rural 
Grameen bank (Bangladesh) 18 Gov't/member-owned bank Rural 
K-REP (Kenya) 4 NGO Both 
LPD (Indonesia) 10 Village/government-owned bank Both 
Source: USAID Evaluation Highlights No. 49. June 1995. P4. 
http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/PNABS521.pdf 22/10/01 
Table 2. Interest rates, Inflation, and return on Assets at Selected Institutions, 1993 
Institution Nominal Estimated Real effective Return on 
effective rate Current rate, average 
Percentage inflation, percentage Assets, 
Percenta~e percenta~e 
ACEP 20 6 14 0.1 
ADOPEM 72 5 67 -0.8 
BancoSol 55 9 46 1.0 
BKD 55 10 46 3.2 
BRI 34 10 25 1.8 
BRK Niger 18 0 18 -11.5 
CorpoSol 71 19 52 4.9 
FIN CA 32 9 23 -6.3 
Grameen 20 8 12 -3.3 
K-REP 38 47 -9 -18.5 
LPD 36 10 27 7.4 
Source: USAID Evaluation Highlights No. 49. June 1995. PS 
http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/PNABS521.pdf 22/10/01 
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TABLE 3: OUTREACH OF MAJOR MFIS (ZAMBIA) 
Organisation Type of Org Number of clients Number of Active 
since program clients 
started 
1. Luena NGO 530 254 
development 
Agency 
2. Lutheran World NGO 13 groups of 10-35 11 groups 
Federation people per group 
3. Women Finance Co-operative 2300 700 
Co-operative 
Zambia Ltd. 
4. Credit Company 35,600 12,100 
management 
Services Ltd 
5. PULSE Holdings Company 13,800 2365 
Ltd. 
6. Pride Zambia Ltd. Company 8031 4341 
7. ECLOF Zambia NGO 2572 903 
8. Zambezi Youth Company 802 631 
Organisation Ltd. 
9. CEBCA NGO 8 8 
10. Keepers Zambia NGO 309 257 
Foundation 
11. People's NGO 40 groups of 10-15 25 groups 
Participation people per group 
Service 
12. National Company 8914 3092 
Savings and Credit 
Bank (Zambia) Ltd. 
13. CPG Castor Oil Company 11 groups of 9-11 No active clients. 
Zambia Ltd people per group Company 
concentrated on 
loan recoveries 
14. Micro bankers' Trust/NGO 1668 1668 
Trust 
15. FINCA ( Company 1433 1250 
Zambia) Ltd 
16. NDSTF NGO 100 86 
17. YSEI (YWCA) NGO 232 200 
Total 76,928 28,215 
Source: AMIZ, June 2000. Unpublished. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Table 4: Recovery Rates for Selected MFis and other Financial institutions 
Name of Organisation Recovery Rate% Comments 
Credit Management 70-75 Rate lowered due to poor 
Services recovery in agriculture 
PULSE Zambia 60-70 Low rate for old product, 
95 high rate for new product 
ECLOF (Zambia) 63-70 
FINCA (Zambia) 100 Just started operations 
Women Finance Co-op 98 Rate improved 40-50% 
Zambia after some intervention 
Lutheran World Federation 45-60 Trading (60-70%), Agric 
(50-70%). Manufacturing 
(45-50%) 
Economic Expansion ill 45-85 45% on whole portfolio and 
Outlying Areas 85% on dues 
Zambia Co-operative 96-100 Rates obtaining before 
Federation Finance Services liquidation 
Co-operative bank of 24 Rates obtaining before 
Zambia liquidation. To be revived 
Zambia National 50-60 For agriculture and trading 
Commercial bank loans 
National savings and Credit 85-95 Microcredit only 
Bank 
Zambia National building 50-60 Recently improved to 85% 
Society after interventions 
P1ide Zambia 80 Chais a (80%), Chachacha 
(94%), Ndola (100%) 
Food Reserve Agency 10-20 
Source: Likulunga and Simonda (2000). Unpublished. 
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Table S: The growth of MFis in Zambia 
Institutions Date of Formation Tar~et Group 
Pulse Holdings Limited 1994 Micro entrepreneurs in per-
urban Lusaka compounds 
Credit management 1992 Micro, small scale 
Services enterprises and small scale 
farmers 
Country Services 1997 Small scale fanners and 
businesses 
C.P.G Castor Oils Zambia 1996 Peasant fanners 
Ecumenical Loan Fund 1993 Women and youth groups, 
(ECLOF) and church related groups 
FINCA Zambia 2001 Self employed poor and 
Village Banks 
Irish Aid 1996 Small scale entrepreneurs 
Keepers (Z) Foundation 1997 Livestock fanners 
Micro Bankers Trust 1996 Microfinance institutions 
(MBT) 
Mukungwila Village Bank 1998 Rural poor 
Peoples Participation 1996 Rural microenterprises 
Service (PPS) 
Pride (Zambia) 2000 Small scale manufacturers 
Progress Financing Ltd. 1998 Women and Youth 
Women Finance Co-op 1995 Low income women 
entrepreneurs 
Zambia Federation of 1998 Women entrepreneurs 
Women in Business 
(ZFAWIB) 
Source: AMIZ, Unpublished papers, 2000. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
APPENDIX 2. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Institution/Funding 
1. Age of institution (years) 
2. Geographical location of clients: 
[]Rural 
[]Urban 
[]Both 
3. What is your source of funding? 
[]Donor 
[ ] Savings 
[ ] fund raising 
[ ] share capital 
[] others (specify) 
4. What is your legal status? 
[ ] Company limited by guarantee 
[ ] Company limited by shares 
[]NGO 
[]Co-op 
[ ] Other (specify) 
5. Do you have a business plan and if so, how many years are covered? 
Services 
1. What services does your organisation offer? 
[ ]Credit 
[]Savings 
[ ]Training/councelling 
[]Insurance 
[ ] Other (specify) 
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2. Do you plan to offer any other services apart from the above? 
[]Yes 
[)No 
3. If yes, what type of services? 
[]Voluntary savings 
[ ] Life Insurance 
[ ] Health Insurance 
[ ] Other (specify) 
4. Why would you offer the above services? 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Interest Rate 
1. What fees do you charge? 
[]Adm.in 
[]Training 
[]Insurance 
2. What is your real rate of interest? ........... . 
3. How do you detennine your rate of interest? 
a. 
b. 
c. 
4. Do you have any competitors? 
[]Yes. 
[]No. 
5. If so, what rates are they charging? 
6. What is your rate of repayment? 
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Client Characteristics 
1. Type of business activities(% of clients). 
[]Trading 
[ ]Manufacturing 
[]Service 
[ ]Agriculture 
[ ]Other (specify) 
2. Ailllual income categories/percentages 
3. Loan use. 
[]Working capital 
[ ]Initial capital 
[ ]Other (specify) 
General target group baselines 
1. Type of economic activities(% of population). 
[]Trading 
[ ]Manufacturing 
[ ]Processing 
[ ]Agriculture 
[ ] other (specify) 
Client Outreach 
1. Number of active clients. 
2. Plalllled client outreach for the period 
[]1999 
[]2000 
[]2001 
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3. Reasons for short fall of clients: 
[]Drop outs 
[]Not enough eligible clients 
[ ] Not enough funding 
[ ] Other (specify) 
4. Drop out rate 
[] 1999 
[] 2000 
[] 2001 
5. Loan sizes 
6. What would you consider as the main hindrances to increased client out reach? 
[] a 
[] b 
[] c 
[] d 
Efficiency Ratios 
Efficiency Ratio 
Operating Costs as 
% of Average 
portfolio 
outstanding 
Salaries as % of 
Average Portfolio 
Outstanding 
Cost Per Unit of 
Cun-ency Lent 
Cost Per Loan 
Made 
Number of active 
borrowers per credit 
officer 
Ratio 1999 2000 2001 
Operating costs/ 
Average portfolio 
outstanding 
Salaries and 
benefits/ Average 
portfolio outstanding 
Operating costs/ 
Total amount 
disbursed 
Operating costs/ 
Total number of 
loans made 
Average number of 
active 
borrowers/ Average 
number of credit 
officers 
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Operational Self-sufficiency-
Year Operating Operating Financing Provision Operational 
income Expenses costs for Loan Self-
Joss es sufficiency 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Financial Sustainability 
Year Operating Operating Financing Provision Cost of 
income Expenses costs for Loan capital 
losses 
1999 
2000 
2001 
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APPENDIX3. 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 
A focus group discussion was held with the board of the Association of microfinance 
Institutions in Zambia on the 27th February 2001. The Discussion focussed on constraints 
to sustainability of microfinance institutions. The main focus was on constraints to 
achieving scale of outreach and external factors. The discussion also looked at the 
question of whether the MFis are charging economic interest rates and whether the cost 
of operation was under control. 
At this meeting the aim and background of the research was given and also the purpose 
for requesting that meeting. This was to verify some assumptions and information 
collected from the selected institution. 
Present at this meeting were the following board members representing some key MFis: 
1. Mr. Abraham Ndofor FINCA 
2. Mr. Micheal Mbulo PULSE 
3. Mr. Derek Molver CMS 
4. Ms. Mary Nandazi MBT 
5. Mrs. Maluba H. Wakung'uma ECLOF 
6. Mr. Paul Mayanja PRIDE 
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7. Mr. Webby Mate AMIZ 
Constraints in Achieving Scale of Outreach 
These were tabled as follows and they are not discussed in any order of priority because 
for the most part, institutions are affected at different levels. 
inadequate funding 
inadequate qualified staff 
poor infrastructure i.e., roads, communication, banks. 
A scattered rural population 
A high dropout rate due to default 
A high population mobility leading to loss in clients 
A poor credit culture 
Political interference 
Interest Rates/Fees 
Most institutions do not calculate to cover costs due to the social nature of their 
objectives. Some pointed out that they calculate interest rate to recover costs over time 
although the time period was not given. Some reasons given for not charging economic 
rates is that consideration is give to enterprises which take a while to become viable 
especially those in agriculture. 
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Cost of Operation 
High operational costs a.re incurred due to poor and inadequate infrastructure especially 
in rural locations. It also takes time for staff to reach productivity because of the need for 
training and re orientation. 
External Factors Affecting Sustainability of MFis 
Policy Environment 
Government policy especially in rural areas does not favour micro enterprise and 
agriculture. There is inadequate support to agricultural marketing and little or no 
incentives to fanners. 
Government through the Food Reserve agency dumps cheap fertilizer on the market and 
spoils the credit culture because of poor repayment. 
Legal/regulatory Environment 
The bank of Zambia is currently supposed to regulate microfinance activities but this has 
not taken off because some institutions are still not registered with the Central Bank. 
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Macroeconomic Factors 
A depressed economy with high unemployment due to closure of companies. 
Manufacturing is especially affected due to high taxes on imported materials so this 
introduces unfair competition to local industries. 
An inflation rate of 19. 6% per annum and devaluation of the local currency leads to 
low returns on any investments. 
Donor funding has become unstable and commitments are not honoured. This affects 
both MFis and government external funding. 
Very high poverty levels leading to low productivity and investment in economic 
activities. 
There is no political will so that the government does not adequately implement 
policy decisions. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
APPENDIX4. 
Table 1. Efficiency and Sustainability Ratios of Credit Management Services 
Year 1998 1999 200() 2001 
End of year Portfolio outstanding 278037613 51238273~ 111900386( 1797304176 
Average portfolio outstanding 22500000( 395210173.5 815693297 1458154018 
[otal expenditure 232625255 648944856 977226116 1448033687 
Operating Costs 220814155 467628982 79315126~ 1304824044 
!Salaries and Wages 99791789 25839149~ 43124640( 591578374 
Provision for Loan losses c 77603041 95229381 77370903 
2ost of Capital 11811 lOC 103712833 88845469 65838740 
Operating Income 243334085 396961098 684683777 78449372~ 
Operating costs as % of average 
portfolio outstanding 98% 118% 97% 89% 
Salaries as % of average portfolio 
~utstanding 44% 65% 53% 41 % 
pperating self sufficiency 110% 73% 77% 57% 
Financial sustainability 105% 61 % 70% 54% 
Source: Calculated From CMS Audited Annual Reports. 1999, 2000,2001. 
List of Formulas Used for Calculation of Ratios 
1. Operating costs as % of average portfolio outstanding 
Operating Costs/Average portfolio outstanding 
2. Salaries as % of average portfolio outstanding 
Salaries and wages/Average portfolio outstanding 
3. Operational self-sufficiency (%) 
Operating Income! Operating Cost + Cost of Capital 
4. Financial Sustainability (%) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Operating Income/Operating Costs + Cost of Capital + Cost of Capital + 
Provision for Loan Losses 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
